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Foreword
In July 2004, the Members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) unanimously agreed
on a framework for liberalising farm trade under the Doha Development Agenda with a
view to establishing a fair and market-orientated trading system.  The ultimate objective
is to promote living standards, employment and sustainable development around the
world, particularly in developing countries, through a process of fundamental reform.
The key ingredients of this process are substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
support, the elimination of all forms of export subsidisation by an agreed date, and a
further opening-up of agricultural markets.
The European Community has already taken important unilateral steps in that direction,
most recently through the introduction of the Single Farm Payment scheme agreed under
the 2003 Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy.  This policy change
coupled with the reforms that will result from the WTO negotiations will expose
European farmers, like farmers in other countries, more prominently to market forces.
The present report provides an important analysis of the opportunities and challenges
ahead for the European farm community in adapting to the new policy environment.  It
also provides guidance for farmers, agro-industries and policy markets with respect to
effective risk management strategies designed to facilitate smooth adjustment and a soft
landing as these reforms are being implemented.  Finally, the report highlights a few
important areas which need to be further explored in the quest for instruments to facilitate
a successful liberalisation of agricultural markets in Europe.
Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi
Director-General
World Trade Organisation
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Executive Summary
The support and subsidies provided to European farmers through the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) has been the main reason for the limited participation of producers in risk
management activities and, in particular, the use of derivative markets as a means for
controlling price or yield risk. Over recent years, however, agricultural price support in the
EU has been reduced and further reforms are ongoing; this is in part, a result of the necessity
to change the policies of the internal market due to: the increasing cost to the taxpayers and
consumers in supporting the agricultural sector, the cost of supporting the accession of the ten
new member states, as well as pressures from WTO to liberalise and open the agricultural
markets, particularly following the August 2004 WTO Agreement. Although the level of
market price support is still very considerable, there has been a shift in support to the
agricultural sector from trade distorting measures to decoupled direct payment to farmers and
payments connected to rural development strategies. This implies that, where intervention
prices previously offered a security net at a relatively high level below which prices would
not fall, farmers’ revenue is now becoming more volatile and linked to the world prices.
Preliminary investigation and statistical analysis of wheat prices suggests that, overall, the
volatility of farm gate prices in EU member states has increased significantly, as a result of
cuts in intervention prices and a reduction of other price support measures, following both the
1992 MacSharry and the AGENDA 2000 reforms. The ongoing reforms will result in further
cuts in market price support measures which, combined with the commitment under WTO to
improve market access, should increase the volatility of agricultural prices even further.
Given this, the best way forward for farmers to cope with high price volatility and market
uncertainty is to use market based instruments (derivatives and insurance products) in order to
reduce income variability associated with price risk, provided that such instruments can be
readily accessed and are economically affordable and properly understood. This report
considers and outlines the opportunities and challenges related to the effective use of market
based risk management products, particularly derivatives, in the European agricultural sector.
Currently, the extent of use of the risk management instruments by European producers
appears to vary across the EU member states and also by the type of instrument. Production
and marketing contracts, particularly those with downstream participants in the supply chain,
appear to be fairly common instruments adopted in a number of markets by some producers.
Diversification of production and income from non-farming activities, such as rental
businesses and off-farm work, are other popular risk management strategies. Insurance
policies are also particularly popular in member states where insurance premia are subsidised
by the government.
Consistent with the trend in European agricultural policy towards reduced market
intervention, in recent years, several commodity exchanges have launched new contracts on
agricultural products such as milling wheat, corn, live hogs and rapeseed. As is shown in the
report, derivative contracts offered by European Exchanges provide a fairly effective method
for agricultural price risk management, and European producers can get the same level of risk
protection as can the US farmers, using the “more established” US derivatives markets.
Despite this, however, the uptake of derivative contracts by EU producers is rather limited.
For instance, in the UK, it is estimated that only 11% of producers actively use derivatives for
the purposes of risk management, and the level of futures trading activity is no more than
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equal to the level of physical production; whereas in the US, not only a higher proportion of
farmers actively use derivatives, but also the volume of futures trading is, on average, 10
times higher than the level of the physical market. The main reasons for the low uptake of
market-based risk management tools in the EU, identified in the report, include:
 Availability of Price Support through CAP
Perhaps the most important reason for the limited use of market based risk management
products for agricultural price risk management by farmers and producers is the security
that has been provided by CAP and the inbred expectation that the consequences of
price volatility will be borne by the taxpayers. In ensuring stable farm prices, the CAP
has meant that producers have had little or no incentives to resort to market-based price
risk management instruments. However, the ongoing reforms in CAP will result in
greater variability in production prices and, hence, will make farmers more aware of the
need to use risk management tools.
 Training and Market Information
The second most important cause of the low participation in derivatives markets is lack
of familiarity or understanding of risk management products due to inadequate
information and training. Only a small number of European farmers and farming
consultants have the knowledge, training and resources, to participate in agricultural
derivatives markets and to use them for price risk management purposes.
 Structure of Existing Derivative Instruments
The affordability of derivative instruments can sometimes be a dissuasive factor in the
uptake of these products by farmers. Examples of this include the cost of buying option
contracts, and the access to funds required to cover initial margins (in the case of futures
contracts) and variation margins (in the case of futures and options contracts). Issues
such as: quality and location mismatches between the physical production and the
futures contracts; liquidity risk, due to the low trading volume in these markets; and the
mixed perception of derivatives, are also reasons for the low uptake of derivatives by
European producers.
 Regulatory Restrictions
Financial regulators such as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK and the
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) in France, classify private farms (i.e. non-
limited companies) as retail investors rather than professional hedgers. This means that
non-limited company farms, despite seeking to use financial instruments for hedging
purposes, have to be recognised by both Futures Exchanges and their member
companies in the same way as would an individual speculator. Due to regulatory
requirements, the treatment of this category of financial instrument user is more
complex, time consuming, and costly, and hence less attractive to all parties involved.
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 Availability of Alternative Risk Management Tools
Finally, the availability of alternative risk management methods such as, land and
product diversification, crop insurance and production contracts, is another contributing
factor to the low uptake of market-based price risk management instruments. Although
farmers may perceive these methods to be more readily understandable and simpler to
use, they may not be as efficient as other risk management techniques - such as
derivative instruments and insurance policies.
One of the major challenges to providers of risk management products is the diversity of the
European agricultural sector due to differences in agricultural products, production levels and
the structure of farm sectors across the member states. Taking these parameters into
consideration, along with the reasons for the low uptake of derivatives by producers, as well
as experiences from other less “protected” agricultural markets (most notably South Africa
and Australia), this report proposes a number of measures to encourage and enable
farmers/producers to use more efficient and effective market risk management tools to control
their price, yield and income risk, i.e.
 Establishing an Educational and Training Programme for Agricultural Risk
Management
It is essential for producers to better understand the benefits of using market instruments
(particularly derivatives and insurance) to manage their risk, and to be able to use such
instruments confidently and effectively. The challenge is to motivate all producers to
learn and eventually use these instruments in order to help them to focus on their core
business activities. Training should not only be targeted at producers but also at those
consultants, banks, trading houses and other organisations, to whom farmers turn for
assistance in managing their risk. For instance, in the UK, Farmcare has been sponsored
by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to undertake a
major risk management training and registration programme for all farming consultants
(“The Risk Management Network”). It would also be beneficial to align such initiatives
with the activities of other organisations actively involved in the promotion of derivative
instruments in the agricultural sector, such as the Agricultural Working Group of the
Futures and Options Association. Similar educational programmes have also been
established by the Home-Grown Cereals Association (HGCA) in the UK, as well as in
other member states, such as France and Greece. The objective of these educational
programmes is to improve growers’ understanding of the basic mechanics of the grain
market and the need to adopt a more strategic approach to grain marketing. These
developments have been very well received by market participants and have also
influenced their attitudes and perceptions towards the use of risk management tools.
Delegate responses have shown that attending workshops has greatly improved their
understanding and willingness to use risk management techniques including options and
forward selling, based on the futures markets. This further illustrates how effective and
properly implemented training schemes can affect farmer’s goals and attitudes towards
risk management. Therefore, more comprehensive training programmes, co-ordinated
by the appropriate authorities at European level, would greatly increase the awareness of
risk in agricultural business and enhance the uptake of risk management instruments and
techniques across the industry.
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  Channelling Market Based Risk Management Products through Farmer-
focused Organisations
Any new scheme for the education and promotion of market mechanisms for
agricultural risk management should invest and build relationships with farmer-focused
organisations such as Co-operatives, Farmer Controlled Businesses and Merchants.
These organisations  are ideal vehicles for training farmers, advising on and taking
collective action in risk management activities on behalf of their members; and training
schemes should enhance their ability to efficiently distribute information to the critical
mass. They can also play an important role in creating economies of scale for farmers,
by reducing the cost of using market risk management instruments. For instance, the
World Bank Project on Commodity Risk Management presents an interesting case of
how agricultural risk management projects can be tailored to meet the needs of small-
scale producers. A similar approach could also be applied to promote and implement
risk management projects for farmers in the EU.
 Development and Marketing of Flexible Derivative Instruments
The diversity of the agriculture industry and business in the EU in terms of, number of
products, quality differentials, regional disparities, and production cycles, indicates that
more flexible risk management instruments are needed. Therefore, the success of new
market-based risk management schemes and products greatly depends on their
flexibility in terms of fulfilling the needs of users, simplicity in terms of trading and
regulation, liquidity, efficiency and cost effectiveness. The use of flexible and tailor
made Over-The-Counter products, which can be used along with exchange traded
products seem to be the best way to address the need for product diversity in the
agricultural sector. Such instruments can be designed to manage not only price risk but
also crop yield risk, as well as weather risk, across a wide range of applications in the
agricultural sector.   
 Proactive Involvement of Exchanges, Banks and Financial Institutions
The role of exchanges, banks and financial institutions working with the agricultural
sector is of utmost importance because they finance farming and agricultural ventures.
Experience from other agricultural economies (South Africa, Australia and the US)
indicates that such institutions can have a vital role in providing appropriate
infrastructure, training, and  instruments, for market-based risk trading.
 Agricultural Policy Management
The Commission and Member States need to be sensitive to the impact that the CAP,
and in particular, market management activities under the CAP have on the liquidity of
existing derivative markets and the development of new ones.  The experience in South
Africa was that during the transitional period where the Maize Board and the nascent
SAFEX Agricultural Markets Division coexisted, the development of SAFEX AMD and
its liquidity were threatened by the ongoing attempts by the Maize Board to continue
managing the market, and in particular maize exports
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Overall it seems that there are opportunities for farmers and producers in different member
states to make wider and more effective use of derivatives, and other risk management
instruments, to stabilise their income, and that these instruments are capable of providing a
viable and effective form of income protection for agricultural farmers – as they do in other
sectors of the economy. It is also interesting to note that the concept of risk management is
not new to the European Agricultural sector given that, prior to the post-war government
policy of subsidising agricultural production, producers traditionally relied on forward
dealings as a means of managing price risk, often in the form of rudimentary “to arrive”
contracts.
There are however, a number of issues that need to be investigated further, prior to the
development of an effective action plan for making the use of market-based risk management
instruments more attractive to EU producers, particularly:
1. a detailed review and assessment of the different risks which EU farmers face and of the
extent to which farmers, in different regions and engaged in farming different crops, etc.
are likely to use risk management products. This is an important step as very little is
known about the individual goals and attitudes of farmers towards risk in different
regions and member states. Understanding the producers’ needs across the different
member states can also assist in appropriately channelling risk management products to
the end users more efficiently;
2 .  the cost and effectiveness of alternative risk management tools in reducing risks
associated with farming activities needs to be assessed and measured against the cost
and effectiveness of the use of central subsidy under the CAP, in order to identify the
economic impact of transition;
3. the need for financial service suppliers, i.e. exchanges, banks and brokers to engage
more closely with the farming community.  Understanding producers’ needs across the
different member states will help to ensure the development of appropriate derivative
and insurance products;
4. further investigation on the issue of how CAP reforms are going to affect all EU farmers
and producers and, most importantly, how risk management tools can alleviate the
problem of higher volatility of prices in different sectors, and across agricultural
products, since this study is necessarily concentrated only on arable crops, most notably
wheat, as it is the single most important agricultural produce of the EU and receives the
largest share of subsidies under CAP.
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1 CHAPTER ONE
Review of Common Agricultural Policy and Structure
of the European Agricultural Market
1.1 Introduction
European agri-businesses, historically, have limited participation in risk management
activities and, in particular, seldom use derivative markets as a means for controlling price,
yield and other risks. However, given the current reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and the reduction in the level of support and subsidies available to the agricultural
sector under the August 2004 WTO agreement, it is expected that soon market participants,
and farmers in particular, will be exposed to greater price volatility which, in turn, will result
in greater income uncertainty. Given these circumstances, the use of market based
mechanisms for managing agricultural risk may be the best available solution for market
participants and farmers. Therefore, the main purpose of this report is to consider the potential
role of derivatives in the European agricultural sector and the challenges related to promoting
and encouraging their use. In so doing, we also examine the causes behind the slow uptake of
derivative products among farmers and agribusinesses in Europe, and assess whether the
experience from similar agricultural “transitions” in other countries, most notably South
Africa and Australia, could provide European farmers and policy makers with valuable
lessons in risk management. Based on our findings and evidence from other countries, the
study suggests a number of ways to make agricultural derivative products more accessible to
agri-businesses in Europe.
The structure of this report is as follows. This chapter presents an overview of the CAP and
the changes that will take place under the 2003/04 review and the WTO agreement; in
addition, it also presents a summary of the structure and composition of the EU agricultural
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sector, which may be one factor contributing to the slow uptake of risk management
instruments. Chapter 2 presents different types of agricultural risks and their impact on
agriculture business along with statistical evidence on how the volatility of EU wheat prices
has been affected by changes and reforms in CAP. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the
different risk management tools which are available in agriculture; and Chapter 4 describes
the process of deregulating the agricultural sector in South Africa and Australia. Chapter 5
discusses different measures for establishing a more effective market mechanism for
agricultural risk management, including increasing the uptake of derivatives. Finally, Chapter
6 concludes this report and proposes areas for future research.
1.2 Overview of the Common Agricultural Policy Reforms
Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European farmers currently receive around 40
percent of their total revenue through subsidies at an annual cost of around €100 bn to
European taxpayers and shoppers.1  Escalation of costs, pressure from WTO, the cost of
supporting the accession of the 10 new member states, increasing food surpluses, and
concerns about the environment, have increased the pressure on the European Union to
reform the CAP. The reformed CAP is likely to make European farmers more competitive
and influenced by world commodity markets.
Prior to 1992, the CAP operated through a combination of agricultural prices fixed above
prevailing world prices, tariff and quota barriers on imports, and subsidies for EU exporters.
The 1992 (MacSharry) Reform was followed up by the Agenda 2000 reforms, both of which
addressed pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to remove trade distorting
subsidies and structural food surpluses. Direct payments to farmers replaced parts of price
support, making farmers more responsive to market signals rather than policy interventions,
and also induced more environmentally sound farming. The more recent 2003-04 Reform
represents the most radical change in CAP’s history with the introduction of ‘decoupling’ and
‘cross compliance’. The majority of subsidies will now be paid independently of production
volume or area planted and linked rather to environmental, food safety, and animal welfare
standards. As a result, commodity price volatility is expected to increase and move more into
line with world prices. These changes in CAP policy entail new challenges in risk
management for European producers and a need to carefully review the price protection
methods that could be suitable for their risk profiles.
1.2.1 CAP Reforms of 2003-04
On 26 June 2003, EU farm ministers agreed to a fundamental reform to the CAP. The key
policy changes include decoupling of direct payments and their organisation into a Single
Farm Payment (SFP), strengthening of rural development, and budgetary discipline in the
CAP budget. The vast majority of subsidies in the form of SFPs are to be paid independently
                                                 
1 According to the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), this is equivalent to an annual cost of
1,000 euros for a family of 4 in the EU. Because food takes up a larger share of the budget of poorer families, the burden
imposed by higher prices falls disproportionately on them.
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of volume of production (known as decoupling). This will make farmers more market
orientated and competitive in their production decisions, while, at the same time, providing
the necessary income safety net. The farmer must, however, abide by minimum standards in
food safety, environmental and plant health and animal welfare (known as cross-compliance)
to receive the full amount of the SFP. The different elements of the reform will come into
force in 2004 and 2005. The single farm payment will come into force between 2005 and
2007; however, if a member state needs a transitional period due to its specific agricultural
conditions, it may defer implementation of the single farm payment until 2007.
It is important to recognise that, when fully implemented, these reforms should be
contributing to a reduction in export subsidies of around 70% compared to their level in 1992,
to around 3 bn euros, and a reduction in trade-distorting domestic subsidy as defined by the
WTO of around 70%. In the same period US support has actually increased, with the 2002
Farm Bill (The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act) reversing many of the trends of its
1996 predecessor (the FAIR Act), and increasing agricultural expenditure by some $83 bn
over the 10 years to 2011.
 
Key elements of the 2003-04 reform include:
 a single farm payment for EU farmers, independent from production (“decoupling”),
although linkage to certain limited coupled elements may be maintained to avoid
abandonment of production;
  the SFP will be linked to environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and
animal welfare standards, as well as to the requirement to keep all farmland in good
agricultural and environmental condition ("cross-compliance");
  a strengthened rural development policy with more EU money, new measures to
preserve the environment, promote quality and animal welfare, and to help farmers to
meet the EU production standards starting in 2005;
 a reduction in direct payments ("modulation") to enable bigger farms to finance the
new rural development policy; and
 a mechanism for financial discipline to ensure that the farm budget is not overshot.
Overall, it is expected that the introduction of the SFP is going to have an impact on the use of
agricultural land since the use of marginal land, which was only possible due to high subsidies
and tariffs, is going to be reduced. In addition, as subsidies will become disconnected from
production, there may be further consolidation where farms are becoming larger. Even so, it is
still the case, that even after the 2003-4 reforms, very substantial levels of market price
support (import tariffs, export subsidies, set-aside and production quotas) will remain.  For
example, the Most Favoured Nation import tariffs on low/medium quality wheat, lamb and
butter are 60% , 58%, and 143% respectively (source: DEFRA).
EU Enlargement and the 2003-04 reforms
The expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 member states required changes in internal EU
policies and the common finances. On 1st May 2004, the enlargement welcomed 75 million
new consumers and 4 million new farmers to the EU. As Poland and other candidate countries
were far more dependent on revenue from the agricultural sector than the EU-15, the
accession of the 10 states to the internal market meant that the trade policy needed
amendments.
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The 2003-04 reforms will also apply to the 10 new member states but with differential
treatment as dictated by negotiated agreements prior to their accession.  SFPs will be phased
in starting at 25% with increments of 5% or more per annum until payments to farmers in new
member states are aligned with those to the existing member states, by 2013. New member
states are also allowed to “top up” these payments by a maximum of 30% per annum from
national funds. The single farm payment will be based on yield and area cropped in the
reference period 1995-1999. During this period the new member states experienced market
disruptions in the transition from central planning to market based economy, which reduced
yields significantly. Therefore, new member states will receive a significantly lower single
farm payment (per hectare payment) than the EU-15, even in 2013.
1.2.2 WTO and CAP Reforms
In July 2004, members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) unanimously agreed on a
framework for liberalising farm trade within the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The
most important aspects of the agreement and its implications for EU are:
Reducing trade distorting agricultural support
 The level of the domestic support subsidies will have to be substantially reduced. A down
payment of 20% of this reduction will be made in year 1 of the implementation period and
since these reductions will be linked to the level of the subsidy, the bigger subsidisers will
have to make the deepest cuts.
 It should be noted that the decoupling of payments under the 2003-04 reforms means that
a major share of EU support to agriculture is moved from the trade distorting
classification under WTO rules (Amber Box) towards the minimal or non-trade distorting
category (Green Box). Consequently, these reforms are in line with the WTO agreement
and should not be called into question 2.
 The agreement also ensures that other developed countries will have to undertake reforms.
Eliminating trade distorting export practices
  EU export subsidies, export credits, credit guarantees and insurance programmes will
either be eliminated by a date to be agreed, if the repayment period is greater than 180
days, or will be subject to stricter regulations and disciplines if the repayment period is
less than 180 days
  Trade distorting practices with respect to export State Trading Enterprises will also be
eliminated.
                                                 
2 For WTO purposes domestic agricultural support is divided into coloured ‘boxes’: The Amber box refers to policies that
directly influence production decisions. The Blue box refers to the exemptions from the Amber box. These include coupled
payments such as the compensatory payments to farmers in the EU. The Green box refers to policies that have minimal or no
effect on production or trade, such as e.g. research, domestic food aid, decoupled payments and rural development schemes.
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Opening-up of  agricultural markets
The agreement will substantially improve market access. Farm tariffs will be cut according to
a single, tiered approach: the higher the tariff, the greater the tariff cut will be. However,
countries can self-select an appropriate number of sensitive products which will be treated in
a more lenient way. In addition, tariff rate quotas will have to be opened in order to ensure
better market access. Overall, this is expected to have an impact on the EU market,
particularly if tariff rate quotas for Black Sea wheat are relaxed.
1.3 Structure of the European Union Agricultural Sector
The agricultural sector in the European Union differs in many aspects across member states
and, as a result, agricultural producers in some countries have more incentives to make use of
risk management strategies, than in others. Many EU farmers are small scale producers with
low production levels and significant levels of off farm-income. In addition, many farmers are
ageing and receive pensions and social security payments as well as farm income. Overall,
this implies that a large proportion of EU farmers are not exclusively dependent on income
from agricultural activities and so less exposed to agriculture-related risks. Targeting
agricultural risk management methods including derivatives to appropriate groups of
producers could, however, help in overcoming some of these challenges.
Agriculture and its activities contribute to no more than 1.6 percent of the total GDP in the
European Union; however, its importance to the economy varies greatly across member
states. In South Europe, for instance, agriculture contributes a significant proportion to the
economy, with countries like Greece (6.5 percent), Spain (3.4 percent) and Portugal (2.5
percent) relying relatively more on the sector (see Annex 1). In these countries, agriculture
employs also a great share of the civilian labour force, reflecting the more concentrated
character of agricultural production and the small farm holdings, with the Greek, Spanish and
Portuguese agricultural sectors employing the largest number of workers - nearly one third of
the total European agriculture employment.
Regarding the distribution of the average farm size, the European agricultural sector is made
up of a large number of small farm operators. About 6.7 million farms are located in the
European Union, of which more than two third are less than 20 hectares, and only 3 percent
are larger than 100 hectares (Figure 1.1). Small-scale producers are mostly located in South
Europe with about 50 percent of the farms with less than 20 hectares being in Greece, Italy,
and Portugal. At the other end of the scale, UK (17 percent), France (15 percent), Denmark
(11 percent), and Luxembourg (10 percent) have the highest share of large farm operators. It
is also worth noting that, due to farm consolidation, the share of the labour force engaged in
production and the number of farm holdings have been shrinking in recent years, yet the total
agricultural area has been maintained roughly at the same level over the same period
(European Commission for Agriculture, 1999-2003).
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Figure 1.1: EU farm size distribution
ha
Source: Eurostat, Agriculture and Fisheries, 2000
In addition, a large proportion of farmers in the European Union consider farming as a part-
time occupation3. More than 5 million producers work part-time i.e. only one in four work
full-time. The importance of part-time work varies widely across member states where most
part-time producers are located in South Europe; from 90 percent in Greece, Italy, and
Portugal to less than 50 percent in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg (Figure 1.2).
Additionally, there seems to be correlation between off farm-work and scale of production.
Highest share of off-farm work is expected to be found in South Europe because these are
generally small-scale producers, whereas in the U.K. part-time work is low as the average
farm size is much higher (see Annex 1). The higher share of part-time farmers in South
Europe is the result of the small natural resource base of many farms in the region and the
high degree of seasonality of agricultural production, which suggests that part-time farming
makes more economic sense (European Commission, 1999).
Regarding their age distribution, European farmers have a high average age, 53 percent of the
total farmers are over 55 years (of whom more than half are over 65 years old) and only 8
percent under 36 years of age. Older farmers tend to rely more on off-farm work than their
younger counterparts and the percentage of producers in every age group is higher for part-
time than for full-time producers and this difference increases with age. The ageing of the
“average” EU producer has been cited as a cause either for concern, i.e. too few younger
people are taking up farming, or reassurance, i.e. the problem of surplus production will be
solved by demographics as older farmers exit the sector. The EU has allowed member states
to institute policies that encourage the intergenerational transfer of farms through early
retirement incentives for older farmers, while providing aid for establishing younger farmers.
                                                 
3 Full-time farmers are defined as those whose work on the farm is equivalent to the annual time of a full-time worker
(Eurostat, 2000)
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Finally, regarding agricultural production, one of the major produce of the European Union is
cereals which accounts for 12.3 percent of the total agricultural production. In 2001 EU
produced about 200 million tonnes of cereals (including wheat, oat, barley, rye and maize);
however, only a few member states account for a large proportion (more than two thirds) of
that production. France (30 percent), Germany (25 percent), and the U.K. (9 percent) who
together produce up to 130 million tonnes of cereals. About one-tenth is made up by other
small producing member states: Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden.
Figure 1.2: EU part-time and full-time producers
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1.4 Conclusions
Over the recent years, agricultural price support in the EU has been reduced and reforms for
further reductions are ongoing; this is, in part, a result of the necessity to change the policies
of the internal market to accommodate the accession of the ten new member states, as well as
a result of pressures from WTO to liberalise and open the agricultural markets. Support to the
agricultural sector is shifting from trade distorting measures to decoupled direct payment to
farmers, and more indirect support through rural development strategies. The consequence of
the reduction in intervention purchase at guaranteed prices is that the farmers’ income is
increasingly reliant on market pricing. As the level of the safety net resulting from
intervention prices falls, farmers’ revenue is now becoming more volatile. The volatility of
prices will also increase as farm gate prices and market prices in the EU converge to
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international levels, particularly following the implementation of WTO agreement.
Consequently, it is important that risk management tools to control income and revenue risk
develop into an integral part of farm operations and agribusiness, in the future.  If they do not,
farmers who would otherwise be viable may be pushed out of business as a result of adverse
price movements.
Nevertheless, the complexities and diversity of the European agriculture sector due to varying
production levels and the size of farm holdings, present several challenges to risk product
providers. Thus, producers in some member states may make more use of derivatives than
others. For example, France, Germany, and the U.K., as the largest cereal producers, are more
likely to take part in promoting and using derivatives markets to cover price and production
risk than, say, in Greece, Spain, and Portugal where they may perceive the derivatives market
as not worthwhile to hedge against adverse price movements. In addition, an ageing farm
population can further slow down the uptake of derivatives in agri-businesses in the future.
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2 CHAPTER TWO
Risk and Risk Analysis in EU Agriculture
2.1 Introduction
Risks are inherent in all farming businesses, and producers have numerous ways to protect
their production, revenue and income against such risks. These range from state supports and
subsidies to production diversification, private insurance policies and derivatives markets.
Depending on what type of risk the producer is exposed to and to what extent it has to be
covered, the producer can choose which risk management instrument to use. Generally, the
existence of different forms of government support provisioned by CAP has made European
farmers very dependent on government intervention and has directed them away from market
risk management instruments. As argued before, recent reforms in CAP - decoupling of direct
payments for producers, the modest reduction in market price support for some commodities,
and the consequent increase in the volatility and uncertainty of their income - call for a closer
look at the capacity of risk management instruments that could be offered to the industry to
manage agricultural risk more comprehensively. In this section we first review the different
types of risks to which European farmers are exposed. Next, we analyse the impact of recent
CAP reforms on the level and volatility of EU agricultural prices. The inevitable conclusion is
that as CAP reforms are implemented, European agricultural prices tend to follow world
prices more closely, both in terms of volatility and levels.
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2.2 Different Types of Risk in Agricultural Industry
All businesses are subject to a great variety of risks. Some of those risks are of a domestic
nature (e.g. risks linked to personal and family situations, health and personal accidents),
whereas others originate from the macroeconomic environment (changes in economic
conditions, interest rates etc.) or the business environment (such as credit risk and institutional
risk). In addition, some types of risk are more specific to agriculture or affect it to a greater
extent than other sectors such as environmental or weather risks. According to Hardaker et al.
(1997), USDA (1999) and European Commission (2001), the major types of risk in the
agricultural sector are:
 Asset Risks which are associated with theft, fire and other loss or damage of equipment,
buildings and other agricultural assets used for production. Losses are normally covered
by insurance or, in the case of catastrophic events, public disaster aid may contribute to
reduce asset losses;
 Production or Yield Risks which are often related to extreme weather events (such as
excessive or insufficient rainfall, hail, extreme temperatures), but also include risks like
plant and animal diseases. Yield risk is measured by yield variability, i.e. fluctuations
relative to the mean in a historical series of production yields. Yield variability for a given
crop differs considerably from region to region depending on climate, soil type and
production methods. It can be measured at farm, regional or country level. Aggregate data
can, to a considerable extent, mask variability at lower levels of aggregation or at the
individual farm level;
  Price Risk which arises from falling output prices and/or rising input prices after a
production decision has taken place. Price risk is measured by the volatility of commodity
prices and can be mitigated by measures of price support or through the use of derivatives.
In open markets, prices are generally more highly correlated across different regions than
yields
 Financial Risks which are related to fluctuations in the cost of borrowing, insufficient
liquidity and loss of equity;
 Institutional and Legal Risks which can be due to changes in the regulatory and legal
environments that producers operate. For instance, the introduction of Single Farm
Payments in CAP and the reduction in the level of import tariffs under the WTO
agreement constitute such risks. Institutional risks are also interrelated with other types of
risk. For instance, the institutional risk of a change in price support has an influence on
price risk. Likewise, imposing environmental restrictions on production has an impact on
yield risk;
  Ecological risks that are related to pollution and climate change, or the result of the
management of natural resources such as water. These natural risks can be considered as
ordinary or extraordinary depending on their frequency and the extent of losses, and they
vary according to natural conditions, farm structures and production practices;
 Market risks which depend on output and input price variability. They can also concern
the demand side and relate, for example, to quality requirements and the emergence of
new products;
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 Currency risk that arises from fluctuations in exchange rates when costs and revenues in
agricultural business are in different currencies. Currency risk is more important for those
producers who rely on export and their revenue determined by the exchange rate at the
time of harvest or sale of the product. In general, European farmers are exposed to
currency risk if their exports are denominated in US dollars.   
2.3 Analysis of Volatility
Having identified the different types of agricultural risks, the next step is to analyse the
impact of changes in the institutional framework of CAP on the pattern or price volatilities.
Investigation of this issue is important as it helps identify whether farmers are exposed to
greater volatility following reductions in the level of subsidies and, hence, provides support
for the use of price risk management tools. The analysis focuses on the performance of EU
soft wheat prices at farm gate level and export prices for the global wheat market because (a)
the cereals market has been undergoing the most radical CAP reforms to date; and (b) wheat
is the most important of all arable crops/cereals in terms of tonnage produced and monetary
value of production, as well as the amount of subsidies being transferred to the producers.
In order to measure the impact of CAP reforms on EU farm gate prices, we examine whether
price volatilities, before and after the MacSharry (1992) CAP reform, show any significant
differences. EU farm gate prices in the five largest soft wheat producing countries in the EU;
and the f.o.b. export prices for wheat from the EU (French Common Wheat, FCW) and the
US (Soft Red Winter, US SRW) are compared and tested for changes in volatility before and
after the 1992 reform. The data series for the EU agricultural sector has been extracted by the
authors from the NewCronos database provided by Eurostat. The world market prices for
wheat were provided by the International Grains Council. The advantage of using absolute
selling prices at farm gate level when testing the hypothesis is that they include the price
support element but exclude any direct payments. This means that any reductions in market
support measures should directly transmit to the prices at farm gate.
Figure 2.1: Development of EU Wheat farm gate and FCW Prices
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Figure 2.1 shows the development of wheat farm-gate prices from 1985 to 2003 for the three
largest producing countries in the EU. It is clear that price levels across different member
states follow each other closely while, since 1993, there has been a declining trend in EU
farmgate prices. It can also be noted that EU farm-gate prices have been higher than French
Common Wheat prices except for approximately three years, from 1995 to 1998.   
In order to identify any significant changes in volatility before and after the 1992 reform, the
series were divided into two sub periods: January 1985 to May 1993 and July 1993 to
December 2003. Price volatilities for each sub-period were then estimated for the five larger
EU producers of wheat, along with two other world benchmark prices for wheat, namely,
FCW and US SRW; subsequently the volatilities, before and after reform, were compared on
the basis of hypothesis testing on variances (F tests) (see Annex 2).  Results from these tests,
in Figure 2.2 indicate that, following the 1992 CAP reform, price volatilities have
significantly increased in three out of the five countries under investigation. Also, it can be
observed that there is no significant change in the volatility of FCW and US Soft Red price
after the 1992 reform which indicates that the observed increase in the volatility of EU prices
cannot be attributed to an increase in the volatility of international prices. It is also clear that
on average the volatility of European prices is well below the volatility of world prices (FCW
and US Soft Red); however, these seem to be converging after the reform4.
The impact of MacSharry’s 1992 CAP reform on the volatility of wheat prices in major
European countries, is also assessed by using an Exponential Generalised Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model which can accommodate structural changes
in the volatility of wheat prices by incorporating a binary dummy variable taking a value of
zero prior to May 1993 and a value of one after that, as shown in Annex 2. Results indicate
that the volatility of farm gate wheat prices in four European countries, as well as the
volatility of world reference prices, are all time-varying. This is in line with findings in other
commodity markets such as oil, metals and other agricultural products, and suggests that
volatility depends on market conditions and the volatility clustering effects due to the nature
of any news or shocks to the market. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the
coefficient of dummy variable in the model for Spain, France and UK, indicates that there has
been a statistically significant increase in conditional volatilities of farm-gate price in these
countries.
The purpose of these tests was to assess to what extent the reforms have had an impact on the
volatility of prices received by farmers, as high price volatility may be translated into
instability and uncertainty in farmers’ income. As suggested by the results, the 1992 CAP
reform resulted in higher volatility in wheat prices in European countries. On that basis, the
gradual removal of much of the market price support, the introduction of decoupled single
farm payments under the 2003-04 reforms and the implementation of the WTO agreement,
are expected to have an even greater impact on the volatility of agricultural prices.
                                                 
4 The same exercise was also carried out in order to identify whether the implementation of reforms under the AGENDA
2000 had a significant impact on the volatility of EU grain prices. Results show that farm gate price volatilities increased in
Spain and the UK after the reform, but decreased in Germany with no significant change observed in the volatility of French
prices. The reason for these mixed results can be attributed to the partial implementation of AGENDA 2000 as well as the
very short sample period available after the reform, for such statistical analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Volatility before and after the 1992 CAP reform
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2.3.1 Analysis of Correlation
Another impact of MacSharry’s Reform could be the convergence in co-movement of
European farm gate prices and international reference prices such as FCW and US SRW. In
order to examine such convergence in correlation, we analyse the correlation coefficient
between European prices and reference prices before and after the implementation of reform
in mid-1993.
Results of correlation analysis (Annex 2) indicate that prior to the MacSharry reform, the
correlation between the farm-gate prices in major European countries and world reference
prices is very low and, in some cases, negative (ranging from -0.392 between French farm
gate prices and FCW to 0.233 between Italian farm gate prices and FCW). This result is
mainly due to the price divergence caused by CAP subsidies and supports prior to the 1992
reform. On the other hand, after the 1992 reform, results reveal that the correlation between
European farm-gate prices and world reference price has increased significantly. For example,
the coefficient of correlation between farm-gate prices in France and FCW or US Soft Red is
about 59%. Similarly the correlation between UK farm-gate prices and world reference prices
(FCW) is 76.1%, and the correlation between German farm-gate prices and world reference
prices (FCW) has increased to 43.1%. This increase in correlation can be explained by the
strengthened linkages between the EU export reference price at the farm gate and the World
reference prices, as a consequence of the 1992 reform.
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2.4 Conclusions
Overall, it seems that the volatility of farm-gate prices in EU member states has become
significantly higher as a result of radical changes to the CAP, through both the MacSharry and
the AGENDA 2000 reforms. The policy measures which were affected in the reforms,
included all price supporting measures such as intervention, tariffs and export subsidies.
Price support is a form of subsidy that distorts the market and generates artificially high
domestic prices. Reductions in intervention prices of 20 percent after the 1992 reform and a
further 15 percent reduction in the AGENDA 2000 reform, have significantly increased the
volatility of farm gate prices in the EU. Reductions of import tariffs and export subsidies of
36 percent also improved market access to the EU, which resulted in an overall reduction in
the prices of imported wheat5. At the same time, the reduction in export subsidies also had an
indirect effect in that farmers had less scope to sell any surplus production in the international
market at artificially high prices, so as to reduce domestic supply. Consequently, fluctuating
production levels also became a contributing factor to higher volatility in agricultural prices.
To summarise, whilst intervention price cuts and a reduction of other price support
instruments are beneficial in efficiency terms and reduce the level of welfare transfers from
consumers to producers, they have increased the volatility of EU prices. The levels of
volatility of the EU prices have not yet reached volatility levels seen on the international
markets, but they are converging. However, the response and adjustment at farm-gate has
been slow and the direct payments may have postponed the impact of price volatility on farm
income volatility. The 2003 reform will result in further cuts in guaranteed finances (market
price support) to the agricultural sector and introduce decoupled single farm payments.
Combined with the commitment under WTO to improve market access, this should increase
the volatility of agricultural prices even further but, at the same time, will improve the
dissemination of price signals to the farmers and speed up farmers’ responses to price signals
in the near future. This should lead to an increase among farmers in demand for risk
management products, such as derivatives, to reduce income variability associated with price
risk.
                                                 
5 The EU committed to these reductions under the negotiations (1986-1993) to revise the GATT in the Uruguay Round on the
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), signed in April 1994. The reductions were implemented over a six year period until
2000.
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3 CHAPTER THREE
Managing Risk in the Agriculture Industry
3.1 Risk Management Strategies
The uncertainties of global markets, prices, government policies, yields, weather, and other
factors can cause significant variability in farm yield, revenue or income. As a result, risk
management has become an integral part of farming and agri-businesses all over the world.
Risk management essentially involves choosing among different strategies and instruments
which can reduce the financial effects of such uncertainties on the yield and the revenue of
producers. The strategies that are accessible to European producers are categorised as on-farm
risk management activities and risk sharing policies (Hardaker et al., 1997, and Bascou 2003).
On-farm strategies, or risk management at farm level, are concerned with income
diversification through growing a portfolio of products, selecting and growing low-risk
products or products where there is a low or negative correlation of price risk, choosing
products with short production cycles, holding sufficient liquidity, part-time farming and
diversifying of income sources beyond agriculture. Risk-sharing strategies, on the other hand,
include insurance schemes, hedging using derivative markets, vertical integration and
contracting. The aim of this chapter is to discuss different risk management strategies
available to European farmers and producers and to highlight the pros and cons of such risk
management tools. The structure of this chapter is as follows: the following section presents
the use of insurance instruments in agricultural risk management. Section 3.3 discusses the
use of derivatives as well as the factors affecting the uptake of derivative instruments. Section
3.4 presents general risk management strategies, other than insurance and derivatives, used in
agriculture. Finally, section 3.5 presents a summary of the use of risk management
instruments in the EU.
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3.2 Use of Insurance in Agricultural Risk Management
The principal idea behind insurance is Risk pooling, where participants pay a premium to a
common fund to cover the losses incurred by any individual in the pool. According to the
European Commission (2001) and Meuwissen et al. (1999) the following insurance product
schemes are identified for risk management purposes in the EU agricultural sector:
Yield Insurance
In the agriculture and farming industry, Yield Insurance is defined as compensation
(indemnity) paid by the insurer to the farmer/producer in the event of the yield falling below a
certain pre-specified level due to named peril(s) such as hail, frost, etc. Yield Insurance can be
based on individual yields or area yields. In the first case, indemnities are paid, if the
individual loss falls below a pre-determined trigger yield, whereas in the latter case a farmer
would only receive a payment if the area yield falls below a trigger yield. When the yield
insured is based on individual production then problems such as moral hazard and adverse
selection may arise. Use of area-based solutions overcomes these problems; however such a
policy is only attractive to farmers if individual yields are well correlated with the area yield,
otherwise the degree of risk reduction for an individual farmer might not be sufficient to make
participation attractive.
For pricing purposes, insurers normally calculate the probability distribution of a loss
occurring, due to named (known) perils, such as hail, storm, fire, etc. based on historic data.
Then, using statistical models, insurers calculate the premium according to the risk and
probability distribution of the occurrence of such events. As a result, the premium of
insurance products increases with the number of perils named and cover against them.
Price Insurance
Price insurance can be defined as indemnity against adverse price movements of farming
products. In this case, the insurer indemnifies the farmer if price levels fall below a pre-
specified level over a certain period (e.g. harvest) in return for a premium. Price insurance
policies are more effective for those products for which objective price data are available. To
avoid moral hazard and adverse selection problems, loss assessment should be based on a
reference price (futures price, spot market price) which cannot be influenced by the farmer.
The major drawback of price insurance is the high correlation of prices which is associated
with a high degree of systemic (i.e. non-diversifiable) risk. Generally, systemic risks can be
dealt with more effectively using derivatives products such as options, futures and swaps
(essentially, any price insurance policy can be replicated with a long put option strategy, the
strike price of the option being the trigger level of the insurance). Thus, the availability of
price insurance may also depend on the availability of derivatives markets where the insurer
can dispose of the excess risk due to high correlation of prices or on the availability of
sufficient re-insurance capacity.
According to Meuwissen et al. (1999) and the EC 2001 report on Risk Management, price
insurance provides less protection for the farmer if losses resulting from a loss of quality are
excluded from coverage. On the other hand, including loss of quality may involve significant
moral hazard problems, as quality depends to a certain extent on farmer’s good practice and
commitment.
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Revenue Insurance
Revenue insurance can be defined as protection against adverse movements in
farmer’s/producer’s revenue due to changes in the market and production level. Therefore,
revenue insurance can be viewed as a combination of price and yield insurance with the
potential advantage of being cheaper than either price or yield insurance because the risk of a
bad outcome is smaller since low yields may be offset by high prices and vice versa.
Revenue insurance can be set up on a commodity-per-commodity basis or for a portfolio of
commodities. The latter could, again, be cheaper for the farmer, because low revenues from
one enterprise are likely to be partly offset by higher revenues from another where revenues
are not positively correlated. However, such insurance may not be feasible when the
correlation between the different commodities and farm yields is high. In addition, access to
objective (reference) price and yield measures is necessary for accurate and fair pricing of
policies as well as for determining payoffs when claims are put forward. The availability of
transparent market information also minimises the instances of problems associated with
moral hazard and adverse selection.
Income Insurance
Income insurance is defined as the cover for losses affecting the farmer’s income or welfare
due to changes in both total revenue as well as total variable costs, such as production input
costs, rent, interest payments, taxes, depreciation and employees’ compensations. There is
always some degree of moral hazard and adverse selection problems involved in a farm’s
income insurance as potential income losses may not only depend on perils but they are
related to large extent on the good will of the farmer and how well he/she manages the
business. Furthermore, certain factors influencing the income (e.g. compensation to
employees, operating costs, inventories) can easily be manipulated and tampered with to show
losses for which the insurance cover is purchased. These two factors could make it even
harder for insurance companies to calculate the probability distribution of occurrence of loss
making events and setting appropriate and fair premia.
Mutual Funds
Mutual funds can also be considered as a special insurance scheme in which participants
(owners of the fund) share the risk amongst themselves in a form of association or club. In the
case of a member incurring a loss, the loss will be fully or partially compensated through the
collected money already available in the fund and an additional collection among participants.
The participation premium is set to cover administrative costs and possible re-insurance costs.
Many mutual funds operate on a regional or local basis. Regional mutual funds have the
advantage that participants (farmers) know each other and there is a possibility for social
control, reducing problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The disadvantage is the
fact that many of the risks they face are highly correlated and, consequently, there is a danger
that many or even all farmers may incur losses at the same time. This could mean an extra
burden in that a farmer who has already incurred losses must contribute to the fund to cover
other farmers’ losses. Solutions to this problem include re-insurance or the teaming up with
mutual funds in other regions which would cover a share of the loss.
From the point of view of the insurer, the risk of underwriting covers, such as revenue,
income or yield in the agricultural sector, could be very high due to high correlation between
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the yield (revenue or income) across all farms in one region. This means that potential losses
could be substantial in any single year and go beyond the capacity of any single insurer. In
such cases, re-insurance policies are purchased by primary insurers who are willing to share
or pass on part or whole of the risk to other underwriters. The benefit of re-insurance for
farmers is that premia can be lowered substantially, as the risk is shared amongst several
underwriters with diversified portfolios. In addition to re-insurance, the formation of
insurance pools is another solution for insurers to pass on or spread the risk. In other words, a
pool or syndicate is set up by insurers to jointly provide insurance for certain risks which an
individual company alone could not cover. 6
3.2.1 Comparison of Use of Insurance across the EU Members
For many years the most common risk management tools for producers in Europe have been
diversification and crop insurance. According to the EC 2001 Risk Management Report and
Meuwissen et al. (2003) the extent to which these products are used varies across different
member states and depends mainly on government policies.7
The involvement of governments in the EU member states in providing subsidies and
insurance cover for producers varies substantially across member states. On the one extreme,
for example, Greece operates a system which through its public insurance organisation,
collects contributions, administers the programme and guarantees coverage of losses. By
virtue of this, the role of the private sector is limited – it only covers products not insured by
the public system, or provides only top-up coverage.
In the intermediate, Spain and Portugal have “public-private partnership” systems, where the
state provides premium subsidies and is involved in reinsurance while the private insurance
industry is integrated into the system, administering the whole programme and covering a
share of the risk.  The high level of insurance cover in Spain is mainly because of the heavy
involvement of the Spanish government in providing subsidies on all types of insurance
covers used by producers for all types of insurable agricultural risks. This means that all
insurable agricultural risks which are covered by the private sector and all types of policies,
are subsidised by the state. However, it is also worth nothing that the proportion of high-value
weather dependent products (such as banana, tobacco, fruit, rice and winter wheat) which are
covered by agricultural insurance cover in Spain, is much higher than the proportion of
insurance cover for low-value all weather products (such as cattle, olives, vegetables).
On the other extreme, Italy, France, Austria and Germany have systems of agricultural
insurance schemes, which are predominantly private. However, these four countries differ
considerably in terms of the role the government plays in providing insurance subsidies for
                                                 
6 Sometimes re-insurance is done using other market instruments such as Mutual Funds and Catastrophic Bonds and options.
Catastrophic Bonds and Options are a relatively new instrument and are designed to provide capital contingent on the
occurrence of a disaster, which is used as cover for the insured. Investors on such bonds receive a high yield if there are no
catastrophes but lose some or all of their investment in the occurrence of a catastrophe. With catastrophic insurance options,
an insurance company can share risk with market speculators.
7 According to Munich Re and Österreichische Hagelversicherung (1999) total public expenditure in Italy, Spain, Austria,
France and Germany for disaster aids and insurance subsidies between 1988 and 1997 was about 6.335 billion Euros. Among
these member States, Italy spent the highest amount (2.740 billion Euros) to compensate producers for crop losses in the form
of disaster aid. A considerable amount of disaster aid was also paid by France (595 million Euros), while Spain paid close to
four times more money for insurance subsidies than for disaster aid (1.153 billion and 314 million Euros, respectively).
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insurance premia. For example, Germany does not provide any premium subsidies, while
Italy grants considerable amounts of premium subsidies to the farming sector (see tables 4.3
in section 4.3.2 of the EC 2001 report). Bascou (2003) argues that, overall, introducing and
supporting insurance schemes which cover a wide range of perils at the level which could be
of interest to farmers and producers, such as those offered in Spain and the US, seems to
involve a considerable amount of state and local government involvement. This may in turn
question the efficiency of such insurance programmes, social and regional equity, and
consistency with WTO requirements in providing support.
3.3 Use of Derivatives in Agricultural Risk Management
Derivative contracts are also widely used for the purposes of price risk management. The
most popular derivative contracts are futures, options and swaps.8 Market agents, confronted
with price risk which arises mainly from supply and demand imbalance in the market, can use
derivatives instruments to control price (and perhaps yield) risk by transferring it to other
individuals who are willing to bear it. The activity of trading derivatives contracts with the
objective of reducing or controlling future spot price risk and revenue is called “hedging”.
Hedging essentially involves taking a position in the derivatives market which can offset any
gains or losses made in the physical market, by locking into a fixed price, or buying a price
floor or price ceiling.
Organised trading in agricultural derivatives markets dates back to the mid 1860s with the
opening of the Chicago Board of Trade in the US. Since then, the trading volume as well as
the variety of futures contracts available for trading has increased dramatically. In the
European markets, agricultural derivatives have been traded since 1929 with the
establishment of the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) 9. A list of the major exchanges
offering agricultural futures contracts word-wide is presented in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Economic Benefits of Derivatives Trading
The growth in derivatives trading over the recent years reflects the increased economic
benefits which futures markets provide to market agents. These benefits are mainly price
discovery, market transparency and risk management through hedging. Price discovery is the
process of revealing information about current and expected spot prices through the futures
and forward markets. Risk management refers to hedgers using derivatives contracts to
                                                 
8 A futures contract is an agreement to trade at a specified future time and price a specified commodity or other asset. The
principal idea behind futures contracts is to protect the holder against adverse price movements prior to a cash sale or
purchase of commodity in the future. Futures hedging is effective in eliminating price risk, but leads to other risks including
basis risk. An option contract gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) an
underlying asset (e.g. wheat) at certain price, known as the strike price, and at a certain point in time, known as the expiration
date or the maturity. Finally, a swap contract is an agreement whereby a floating price for a commodity is exchanged for a
fixed price for the same commodity over a specified period for a defined volume. The floating price is normally the
prevailing market (spot) price for the asset and the fixed price is the price which is negotiated and agreed before the initiation
of the swap contract.
9 The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) merged with London Commodity Exchange (LCE) in 1996.
Later in 2001, Euronext acquired LIFFE and was renamed to Euronext.liffe.
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control their spot price risk. The dual roles of price discovery and hedging provide benefits
that cannot be offered in the spot market alone and are often presented as the justification for
futures trading (see e.g. Garbade and Silber, 1983).
Table 3.1: World futures and options markets in agricultural commodities
Exchanges
Location & Date of
Establishment
Agricultural Products Offered
Euronext.liffe  London, Paris, Amsterdam,
Lisbon & Brussels; 2000
Cocoa, Robusta coffee, white sugar, feed
wheat, milling wheat, rapeseed, corn,
potatoes
Warenterminborse Hanover AG
(WTB).
Hanover; 1998 Hogs, piglets, potatoes, wheat, brewing
barley
Budapest Commodity Exchange
(BCE)
Budapest; 1989 Corn, wheat, feed barley, rapeseed,
soybean, sunflower seed.
Poznan Commodity Exchange Poznan, Poland; 1991 Corn, wheat, sugar.
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) Chicago; 1848 Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean
meal, wheat, oats, rough rice, mini corn,
mini soybeans, mini wheat, Dow AIG
Index*
Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME)
Chicago; 1874 Beef, dairy, e-livestock, fertilizer, hogs,
lumber
New York Board of Trade
(NYBOT)
New York; Cocoa, coffee, cotton, FCOJ, sugar
Kansas City Board of Trade
(KCBOT)
Kansas; 1856 Wheat
Minneapolis Grain Exchange
(MGE)
Minneapolis; 1881 Wheat, three classes of wheat Indices**,
national corn index (NCI), national
soybean index (NSI)
South African Futures Exchange
(SAFEX)
Sandown; 1988 White maize, yellow maize, wheat,
sunflower seed, soybeans
Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) Sydney; 1960 Wool, New Zealand Broad Wool,
MLA/SFE cattle.
Winnipeg Commodities Exchange Winnipeg; 1972 Canola, Barley, Flaxseed, Feed Wheat
*Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index Futures (AI)
**Hard winter wheat index (HWI), Soft red winter wheat index (SRI) and Spring wheat index (SWI).
Source: Battley, Nick (1999) The world’s futures and options markets, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, LTD.
The Price Discovery Role of Derivatives Markets
Derivatives markets provide a mechanism through which the supply and demand for an asset
are brought into alignment, both in the present and over time. According to Edwards and Ma
(1992), derivative prices reflect the current expectations of the market regarding the level of
spot prices that will prevail in the future. Therefore, through derivatives trading, information
about the expectations of market participants regarding the future supply and demand balance
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for a commodity is assimilated to produce the price of the derivatives instrument for a later
date. As a result, derivatives trading and contracts contribute to a more transparent market.
By reflecting expectations about future spot prices, derivative prices trigger production and
consumption decisions that reallocate the temporal supply and demand for a commodity in a
way that promotes an efficient allocation of economic resources. In particular, expected future
shortages of a commodity could be alleviated by increased future production, while current
shortages are alleviated by the deferral of current consumption to a later period, when spot
prices will be lower. In addition, due to their liquidity and price transparency, derivative
prices are also used for determining the underlying spot prices in many agricultural markets.
In summary, the existence and functioning of derivatives markets determines and makes
visible both current and expected spot prices. This availability of information contributes to
market transparency, reduces search costs and provides signals that guide production and
consumption decisions, and result in a more efficient allocation of economic resources.
Moreover, the benefits of price discovery accrue not only to the futures markets participants,
but also to anyone else with an interest in the future value of the underlying asset.
The Risk Management Function of Derivatives Markets
In general, using agricultural derivative products presents several benefits to society (Kolb,
1997). First, derivative markets give producers the opportunity to participate in risky
activities which they would not otherwise undertake. Second, trading away price risk using
agricultural derivatives results in a more efficient allocation of resources compared to using
on-farm methods for avoiding risk (Myers, 1991 and Hardaker et al. 1997). Third, use of
price risk management strategies is likely to stabilise farmers’ income, which in turn implies
more stable expenditure on farm inputs and family consumption, thereby providing greater
security for rural businesses and society as a whole through increased rural employment. A
downturn in farm incomes and in spending by farm families could lead to the closure of some
local businesses and to a withdrawal of services, yet these lost facilities may not be fully
replaced when farmer’s incomes recover later (Hardaker et al. 1997). Finally, if farmers can
manage market risks effectively there will be less pressure for taxpayer-funded support prices
or emergency aid packages and a corresponding reduction in the business resilience of the
farming industry.
3.3.2 Hedging using Derivatives – An Example
To illustrate the benefits of derivative contracts for the purposes of risk management, we
present a simple hypothetical hedging exercise. Consider the case of a UK wheat producer
who wants to secure his revenue from fluctuations in wheat prices. For this he considers using
a hedging strategy with options and futures on wheat. More specifically the following
strategies are considered:
Strategy A: Hedging wheat price risk three months forward using wheat put options
contracts with a strike price which is 3% below the current spot price;
Strategy B: Same as A but strike price is 1% below current spot price;
Strategy C: Hedging using 3-month futures contracts by establishing a short futures
position.
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These positions are then kept open for a period of three months at the end of which the
positions are closed and new positions are established for the subsequent three months. This
exercise is repeated for subsequent three month periods from January 1997 to December
2003. The performance of these strategies is then compared to the case where the producer
simply decides to “take his chances” and leave his position open i.e. selling the crops at the
market price without using any risk management tools 10.
Table 3.2: Variability of the Payoffs for the four strategies for the period 1997-2003
Average
(£/ton)
Standard
Deviation (£/ton)
Variance
Reduction
Sales only strategy (Unhedged) -1.66 7.93
Put 3% Strike (Strategy A) -0.23 4.66 65.4%
Put 1% Strike (Strategy B) 0.13 3.73 77.9%
Short Futures (Strategy C) -0.95 5.85 45.5%
Notes: Average and Standard deviation are for the four series presented in Figure 3.1. Variance Reduction measures the
reduction in the variances (i.e. standard deviation squared) of the payoffs from the different strategies over the unhedged
strategy.
Figure 3.1 : Payoffs for the four strategies for the period 1997-2003
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The descriptive statistics and payoffs from these strategies are presented in Table 3.2 and
Figure 3.1, respectively. The best strategy is the strategy that provides the lowest possible
variability of the hedged position. We can see that the “leave open” position results in the
largest variation in payoff which implies that, if producers do not take any hedging actions,
then they will be exposed to substantial price risk. Both option strategies provide good risk
protection. Overall strategy B (1% put) is superior to A (3% put) reflecting the fact that
buying put options with strikes which are 1% below the spot market represents a good
                                                 
10 Futures price series are collected from Datastream, and Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
provides producer price series. The put options are priced using the Black-Scholes option valuation model (see Hull, 2002 for
more details). As inputs in the Black-Scholes model we use the realised annualised volatility of producer prices and interest
rates are assumed to be 4% over the period examined.
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balance between cost of options premia (1% puts are more expensive that 3% puts) and
frequency of exercise; in other words, over a three month period, the spot market is more
likely to drop by 1%, as opposed to 3%, and, as a result, 1% puts will be exercised more
frequently than 3% puts thus providing superior risk protection. It should also be mentioned
that the choice of 1% and 3% strike price intervals should differ across different contracts and
primarily reflects the volatility of the underlying market. Finally, the futures strategy also
performs well by reducing the risk of the unhedged position by as much as 45.5%. Overall,
this example further illustrates the usefulness of using derivative contracts for the purposes of
price risk management.
3.3.3 Factors Affecting the Uptake of Derivative Contracts
Derivative markets could provide a theoretically sound agricultural risk management method
for farmers (as well as processor, merchandiser or others). Yet European agri-businesses were
slow in the uptake of derivative products; for instance, only as much as 11 percent of UK
grain producers has been reported to employ agricultural derivative products.11 The low
participation in the market can also by judged by the number of futures contracts traded
relative to the physical base, in Figure 3.2. In the UK for instance, the volume in the futures
market is equivalent to the level of physical activity. In contrast, in the US, futures volume is
on average 10 times the level of physical activity while, in South Africa, the ratio in 2003 was
at about the same level as in the US. Lack of correlation and basis risk, the presence of
Common Agricultural Policy, inadequate information and training, liquidity risk, transaction
costs and affordability and availability of other risk management tools may have contributed
to the low participation of agricultural producers in the European derivative markets. These
reasons are explained in more detail next.
Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy provides income stability through price support and direct
subsidies. Having ensured a stable farm income, European producers have had little or no
incentives to conduct hedging, whether on an individual basis or through co-operatives.
Unless the European Union initiates market measures in the agricultural sector, farmers will
not perceive these products as a feasible risk management tool. However, reforms in CAP
under the 2003-04 review and the reduction in trade distorting support measures under the
WTO agreement will result in greater variability in production prices and, hence, will make
farmers more aware of the need to use risk management tools.
                                                 
11 National Farmers’ Union  (NFU) Report on Farm Risk Management, 2000.
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Figure 3.2: Ratio of Wheat Futures Volume over physical production in the UK, US and
South Africa for the period 1989-2003
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Source: DataStream, FAO Agricultural statistics. Unit of trading differs between the exchanges. On Euronext.liffe and
SAFEX the futures contract size is one hundred metric tonnes whilst on CBOT the futures contract is 5,000 bushels or 136
metric tonnes. Contracts presented in this graph are adjusted to reflect the different sizes. SAFEX contract is for White
Maize.
Training and Market Information
Another frequently cited cause for the low participation in derivatives markets is lack of
understanding of the products due to inadequate information and training. Risk management
activities require considerable knowledge of financial instruments and it seems that only a
minority of European farmers has the knowledge and training to understand and make use of
agricultural derivatives. In addition, the larger participants in the market tend to be food
industry processors, merchants, and (to a lesser extent) co-operatives as they posses the
necessary resources and know-how to engage in agricultural derivative transactions. To that
extent national organisations take initiatives to train and educate market participants about the
use of derivative products. In the UK for instance, the Home Grown Cereals Association
(HGCA) recently ran numerous one-day seminars on options on grains and currency, to assist
the UK cereals sector in risk management. The HGCA also allows registered customers to
view market reports, market intelligence, and the latest future and currency prices, on its
website. In addition, other UK organisations like the National Farmers’ Union (NFU),
National Pig Association (NPA), and Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC) are currently
involved in the distribution of information to their members and in training in risk
management tools including derivatives.
Correlation and Basis Risk
Hedging in futures markets does not come without risk. Variation in basis or basis risk could
cause futures prices to deviate from cash prices and, as a consequence, the hedger’s harvested
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production would not be covered completely and effectively using futures contracts 12. This is
because an effective hedge also requires a high correlation between price changes in cash
price and the futures price. A high correlation in price changes results in a better euro for euro
offset between cash and futures position; if this were not the case, the production would not
be sufficiently covered by the futures market and extra gains or losses would arise.
To assess the performance of agricultural futures contracts, we examine the effectiveness of
the wheat futures contracts traded at Euronext.liffe, in reducing physical price risk for
European producers.13 Hedge ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness are therefore
estimated for producer prices for feed and milling wheat in the UK, Ireland, Germany, Spain,
Portugal and France. These results are then compared with similar wheat futures contracts
offered in three main exchanges in the US (CBOT, KCBOT and MGE) and extensively used
by US farmers/producers for price risk management purposes. The examination is carried out
from July 1999 through December 2004 resulting in 66 monthly time series observations.
Futures and US wheat prices are collected from DataStream while European wheat prices are
from HGCA.
Results of effectiveness of wheat futures contracts offered by Euronext.liffe as risk
management tools for different European feeding and milling wheat products are presented in
Table 3.3. Similarly Table 3.4 reports the hedging effectiveness of three US traded wheat
contract in managing the price risk of three different grades of wheat produced in the US. Plot
of price levels are also presented in Annex 4.
Starting with the results for the UK market (Table 3.3) it can be seen that a producer would
have reduced the variability of the selling price of his product by as much as 52.1% (degree of
risk reduction) using the Euronext.liffe feed wheat futures contract.14 Similarly, for French
milling wheat, a 65.7% reduction in volatility of farmers’ selling price can be achieved using
the Euronext.liffe milling wheat futures contracts. However, farmers and producers in other
regions (Germany, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) achieve considerably lower hedging
effectiveness, ranging from 16.7% to 44.2%, when they use wheat futures contracts offered
by Euronext.liffe. This lower hedging performance in other European countries is mainly due
to basis risk. This means that, although Euronext.liffe futures contracts are good hedging
instruments for UK and French market players (farmers, cooperatives, merchants, traders and
consumers), they provide less effective risk protection across other types of European wheat.
Results of hedging effectiveness of US traded futures contracts (CBOT, KCBOT and MGE)
for managing price risk of three different grades of wheat produced in the US are quite
comparable to those traded in Europe. Results reveal that the best instrument to hedge
Number 2 Soft Red Wheat is CBOT futures with 64.3% effectiveness, the best contract to
hedge Number 2 Hard Red Wheat is KCBE futures with 57.9% effectiveness, and the best
contract to use for hedging Hard Red Spring Wheat is MGE futures with 76% risk reduction
ability. It can also be noted that cross hedging these wheat futures results in lower hedging
                                                 
12 Basis is the difference between local cash price and the relevant futures contract price for a specific location at a particular
time. Basis risk typically arises when there is imperfect correlation between spot prices and futures prices.
13 To assess the hedging effectiveness we use the minimum variance hedge ratio methodology. In other words, hedge ratios
(number of futures contracts a hedger must buy and sell for a given physical position) are estimated in such a way so that the
risk of the physical position is minimised. This methodology is described in Annex 3.
14 Note that the hedging effectiveness of 52.1% is achieved using a “hedge ratio” of 0.8. In other words, for every £1 of
physical production, the hedger needs to buy 80p worth of futures contracts
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effectiveness because of the increased basis risk due to quality, location and stock level
differences.
Table 3.3: Hedging Effectiveness for EU wheat prices against corresponding exchange
traded wheat futures contracts
Panel A: European Wheat Prices vs Euronext.liffe Feed Wheat Futures
UK Feed Ireland Feed German Feed German Mill Spain Feed Portugal Feed France Mill
52.1% 44.4% 22.5% 19.6% 22.5% 42.6% 44.6%
Panel B: European Wheat Prices vs Euronext.liffe Milling Wheat Futures
UK Feed Ireland Feed German Feed German Mill Spain Feed Portugal Feed France Mill
17.9% 29.4% 16.7% 36.6% 23.6% 38.9% 65.7%
 Figures presented are measures of hedging effectiveness; i.e. they reflect the percentage reduction in the variance of the
physical position.
Table 3.4: Hedging Effectiveness for US wheat prices against corresponding
exchange traded wheat futures contracts
Panel C: US Wheat Prices vs US Wheat Futures
CBOT Futures KCBOT Futures MGE Futures
Number 2 Soft Red 64.3% 34.7% 61.3%
Number 2 Hard Red 46.6% 57.9% 54.0%
Hard Red Spring 53.5% 45.2% 76.0%
  CBOT, KCBT and MGE are the Chicago Board of Trade, the Kansas City Board Trade and the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange, respectively.
 The underlying for CBOT, KCBOT and MGE are Number 2 Soft Red, Number 2 Hard Red and Hard Red Spring wheat,
respectively.
 Figures presented are measures of hedging effectiveness; i.e. they reflect the percentage reduction in the variance of the
physical position.
One possible solution to the problem of basis risk is the use of a certain type of OTC
derivatives instruments known as “Contracts for Difference” (CFD). These contracts can be
used to reduce basis risk and help farmers to lock in Euronext.liffe prices in order to increase
the performance of their hedging exercise. CFDs, which are essentially swaps contracts, are
extensively used by Australian farmers, producers and other market participants, who are
interested in locking their prices into futures contracts traded in the US or other world
benchmark prices (see section 5.4.1 for more details on CFDs).
Liquidity Risk
Futures contracts on feed wheat have been traded at Euronext.liffe since 1964. Yet the
contract has so far not attracted participation by all market participants (such as cooperatives,
merchants, traders and manufacturers) and does not have the involvement of the majority of
UK producers and, as a result, trading volume has remained at relatively low levels. In
contrast, the agricultural derivative markets in the United States and South Africa have been
more successful in attracting sufficient liquidity for hedgers and traders alike. Figure 3.3
presents the liquidity – measured as number of traded contracts – of the wheat contract at
CBOT, the white maize contract at SAFEX and the feed wheat contract at Euronext.liffe. We
can see that for every feed wheat contract traded at Euronext.liffe there are 14 white maize
contracts traded at SAFEX. However, CBOT is the most liquid of the two markets with the
annual volume in 2003 representing the equivalent of 900 m tonnes of physical trade.
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Liquidity is an important parameter in attracting participation in derivative markets.
Participants need to know that there is adequate depth in the market so that they can buy or
sell a contract without the market moving significantly and also that they will be able to move
out of the market (i.e. close a position) quickly and efficiently.
A key factor affecting liquidity relates to the involvement of the international trade.  If exports
are managed administratively (or could be managed administratively), as is currently the case
in the EU, traders hedging international risks on EU derivative markets are exposed to EU
policy risk.  In South Africa, volumes and liquidity only rose significantly once the Maize
Board had withdrawn from its role of managing the export market.
Figure 3.3 :Volume of wheat futures contract traded in Chicago (left axis), London
(right axis) and South Africa (right axis) for the period 1989-2003
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Note: Unit of trading differs between the exchanges. On Euronext.liffe and SAFEX the futures contract size is one hundred
metric tonnes whilst on CBOT the futures contract is 5,000 bushels or 136 metric tonnes. Contracts presented in this graph
are adjusted to reflect the different sizes. SAFEX contract is for White Maize. Source: DataStream
Affordability and Accessibility
Several organisations have reported that the costs of trading derivatives privately, i.e.
transaction costs, outweigh the gains, or the products are insufficient in meeting producers’
needs (EC Report on Risk Management, 2001). For large producers, the cost issue is less of a
problem;15 however, cost issues could have a larger impact on small-scale producers with
limited resources and time available to manage derivative products. Transaction costs and the
prices of financial products are also affected by whether the market is liquid enough. For
instance, the greater the liquidity in a market, the lower the level of transaction costs.
Similarly, purchasing a financial product (e.g. option or insurance) in an illiquid market will
command a higher price due to a “liquidity premium” embedded in the price.
                                                 
15 Grant (1989) finds that costs from futures trading such as commissions and opportunity costs in placing margin deposit
have little effect on overall hedging performance.
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Accessibility refers to whether a market participant can access information about derivatives
instruments (such as contract price, contract specification, historical information, etc.) with no
restrictions, and whether they are able to correspond with their brokers, counterparties and
advisors with no impediments. The technological advances in recent years in information
dissemination, use of internet and introduction of electronic trading provide a great
opportunity for making different risk management products more accessible to small and
medium-size European farmers and producers, both in terms of training and trading.
Financial regulation also plays an important role in the sense that it provides the institutional
framework within which risk management activities may be carried out. Changes in financial
regulations may affect the ability and capacity of a financial services provider to offer, say,
agricultural derivative products to producers.
3.4 Other Risk Management Methods
Common risk management tools for producers in Europe are diversification and crop
insurance. In the UK for instance, producers traditionally consider diversification as a sound
strategy because it can take a number of forms like varying product mix to reduce variability
of returns, or earning income from non-farming activities. The majority of producers, nearly
65 percent, derive some income from working off farm. Overall, it seems that the
practicalities and availability of other risk management tools can pose a trade-off situation to
farmers. These risk management methods are discussed next:
Diversification is intended to reduce the variation of overall returns from farming activities
that have net returns with low or negative correlation. For instance, higher income from some
farming activities can potentially offset low income from other activities which have seasonal
irregularities. Diversification can be applied to income sources and off-farm income; a crop
farmer may choose to become an income spreader, which involves producing different kinds
of crops or both crops and livestock, so that localised or crop-specific weather disasters are
less likely to reduce yields for all crops simultaneously. Off-farm income is simply when the
farmer obtains his income from other non-farm activities, for example taking work at the local
shop or operating hostels.
Vertical Integration includes all of the ways the output from one stage of production and
distribution is transferred to another stage, so that a firm’s ownership or control of a
commodity can move across from production to marketing. Vertical Integration can then be
used to reduce risks arising from variation in the quantity and quality of agricultural inputs or
outputs. However, it may not be very effective against price risk as the overall profitability of
the vertically integrated entity depends on the fluctuation of input and output prices. An
example of a vertically integrated agricultural business can be a medium-size cattle or hog
producer who is involved in other parts of the supply chain such as processing, distribution
and sales of the meat products. Here the farmer can at least control part of the price,
production and quality risks (Mills, 2003)
Marketing Contracts or Contracting involves a seller and buyer who enter into a contract
whereby a specified price is agreed on a commodity for delivery in the future; that is, harvest,
or when the commodity is ready to be marketed. Marketing contracts determine price, quality
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and amount of product to be delivered. In marketing contracts, the producer usually remains
fully responsible for the management decisions during the production process. In the US,
marketing contracts are more widely used than production contracts: in 1998, 21 percent of
the total value of US production was sold under marketing contracts. Topping the list of crops
under marketing contracts were fruits and vegetables (with US $10 billion, or 45 percent of
total production, sold under a marketing contract), followed by cotton, corn, soybeans and
sugar. For cattle, just under 10 percent of the value of production was sold under marketing
contracts whereas, for dairy products, this was more than 60 percent. In order to stimulate the
use of futures and options markets for livestock products, the US has started pilot
programmes for dairy, cattle and pig farmers, involving training in the use of these tools and,
in some cases, subsidisation of premia payments.
Production Contracts specify the quantity and quality of input and output to deliver a
commodity at a specified price at the time of harvest. Production contracts are made between
producers and economic agents downstream in the supply chain. Processors commonly enter
into production contracts with producers to ensure timeliness and quality of commodity
deliveries and to gain control over the methods used in the production process. In the US, in
1998, 14 percent of the total value of production was produced under production contracts.
These contracts are mostly used for livestock: poultry and poultry products accounted for over
50 percent of the total value of commodities under production contracts, and cattle and pigs
for another 41 percent.
Safety Net Programmes are schemes promoted by governments to stabilise farmers’ income
by regularly contributing to an account in a high-income year and withdrawing from it in a
low-income year. These accounts are normally topped-up by government support. Several
such schemes exist in European countries that allow farmers to smooth their income over a
longer time period. In the UK for instance, under the Corporation Taxes Act, farmers can set
trading losses forward against future profits of the same trade, against other income of the
same or previous year, or against capital gains of the same or previous year.
Financial Leverage means borrowing capital to help finance the farm business. Generally,
high levels of debt relative to net worth are considered risky. The optimal amount of leverage
depends on several factors including farm profitability, the cost of credit, tolerance for risk,
and the degree of uncertainty in income. Increasing the level of debt, increases the capital
available for production allowing expansion of the business, but also entails incurring a
repayment obligation and creates the possibility of loan default because of the risks inherent
in farming operation.
Liquidity is defined as having cash or commodities at hand which the farmer can easily turn
into cash in order to meet her short-term financial obligations or to provide protection against
adverse market movements. For example, farmers can enhance liquidity by having cash
available and storing commodities, or other assets, which can efficiently be converted to cash
without incurring a major loss. Liquidity is also crucial for highly leveraged operations. The
more leveraged the farm, the greater the need for careful liquidity management in order to
make timely payments on loans and other obligations.
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3.5 Use of Risk Management Instruments in the EU
The extent of the use of insurance policies and financial risk management instruments by
European producers appears to vary by the type of instrument. Production contracts and some
types of marketing contracts, particularly contracts with downstream participants in the
supply chain, appear to be fairly common instruments adopted by some types of producers in
respect of some commodities. It seems likely, however, that larger and possibly more
specialised producers are in the best position to adopt this form of risk management.
According to the European Commission (2001) in the UK for instance, producers consider
diversification as a sound strategy because they rely on product mix diversification and
income from non-farming activities such as rental businesses and off-farm work. The majority
of producers, nearly 65 percent, derive some income from working off-farm. In the EU, the
share of farmers diversifying their activities outside agriculture is also considerable. In fact,
the average level reached 29 % in 1997, with some differences among Member States.
According to statistics available the highest proportion of part-time farmers with off-farm
income sources can be found in Sweden (54 %), Finland (49 %), Germany (45 %), and
Austria (39 %), whereas Belgium and Luxembourg (17 %) are at the lower end of the scale.
In the south of Europe the share of off-farm activities is relatively moderate with Spain (28
%), Greece (27 %), Portugal (33 %), and Italy (24 %).
Crop insurance is also widely used and is particularly popular in Spain, where insurance
companies offer coverage for most natural agricultural risks and premia are subsidised by the
government. In fact, farmers have the option to choose the level of coverage and it is
estimated that as much as 70 percent of the cereal plantation area in Spain is insured. Also, in
the Netherlands, mutual insurance schemes have been used widely for contagious disease
outbreaks both in crops (horticulture and potatoes) and livestock (poultry). The Commission
has recently proposed the setting up of similar funds in Member States intended to stabilise
revenue in the pig sector. These regulatory funds would be financed by producers and would
enable them to stabilise revenue through a system of levies to be collected during periods
when their economic situation is satisfactory. In exchange, payments would be made during
periods of a difficult market situation (EC Report on Risk Management, 2001).
Finally, recently, there have been considerable efforts in Europe to develop agricultural
futures and option markets. At least four new commodity exchanges that offer futures and
options based on agricultural commodities have been established since 1988.  Although many
of the new European agricultural futures and option markets are not actively traded, changes
in economic and agricultural policies over the last 10 to 15 years appear to have created more
favourable conditions for the development of futures and option markets. In particular, many
of the new agricultural derivative markets were introduced after the implementation of
reductions in price supports for major commodities due to the 1992 and AGENDA 2000
reforms, as well as implementation of the 1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture. This has
resulted in the launch of a number of new commodity and agricultural exchanges in Central
and Eastern Europe as well as the introduction of at least 38 new agricultural futures and
options contracts. These new contracts include futures and/or options for wheat, corn, live
hogs, rapeseed, rapeseed meal, and rapeseed oil. On the whole, it seems that, consistent with
the trends in European agricultural policy towards reduced market intervention, most new
European agricultural futures contracts have been designed to reflect the needs of producers
and are more in line with agricultural commodities produced and consumed within Europe.
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4 CHAPTER FOUR
Deregulation and Derivatives Markets: Experience of
Other Countries
4.1 Introduction
The ongoing 2003-04 reform in CAP, combined with the commitment under WTO to improve
market access, is expected to increase the volatility of EU agricultural product prices. As a
result, where intervention prices previously offered a floor below which prices would not fall,
farmers’ prices are now becoming more volatile and linked to the world market. This is
expected to lead to an increase among farmers in the demand for risk management products,
such as derivatives, to reduce downside income risk associated with price risk. It is
interesting, therefore, to compare the case of the EU with other countries where there is little
or no government intervention in the agricultural sector, and market participants actively use
the derivatives markets for the purposes of risk management. Two such markets are the South
African and the Australian. The South African example is worthwhile looking at because,
following the deregulation of the maize market, producers and other participants have learned
how to deal with price risk by using the local futures and options market. The Australian
market is also interesting because, despite the absence of organised derivatives markets for
key agricultural commodities, there is widespread use of OTC options and price swaps and,
nowadays, the Australian market is considered as the single most advanced market in the
world for agricultural risk management.
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4.2 The South African Experience
In the mid 1990s, the agricultural marketing system in South Africa underwent significant
changes. Government controls and the level of market price support were considerably
reduced, the domestic maize market was gradually liberalised and the Maize Board, the
statutory authority responsible for determining every aspect of the production and marketing
process of maize in South Africa, was closed. Although South African producers were faced
with a dramatic change in their risk environment, they managed to readjust their risk
management activities. Operating in a largely deregulated environment, they now participate
extensively in the agricultural derivatives market in which 20 to 30 percent of producers trade
directly on the exchange and through co-operatives 16. In addition to being members and
hedging actively on the exchange, co-ops and financial institutions also provide a number of
ancillary services to farmers and participants such as production credit and the provision of
credit for futures margins.
4.2.1 White Maize and Deregulation
The South African agricultural sector, and in particular maize production, was initially based
on a free market system in which maize was marketed, bought and sold, without intervention
from the government. In the mid 1930s, the government established an increasingly strict grip
over the supply chain of maize. In 1937, the Maize Board was set-up with the purpose of
controlling and regulating the maize market. The Board was a statutory body controlled by
farmers (who had the majority of board members) and had all the legal powers necessary for
determining which persons should produce, handle, process and trade maize. The Maize
Board dictated almost every aspect of the marketing process including the price the producer
was paid, the financing of storage facilities, the purchases for millers, the shipment of
production abroad, and even information and inspection services. The maize marketing
system was financially unsustainable, and a series of reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s,
sought to reduce the fiscal burden for the South African Government and to make the system
more market oriented.  But even as late as 1994, the Maize Board was still running a very
interventionist and distorting maize marketing scheme. The political reforms of the early
1990s provided the necessary political impetus for the move to full liberalisation of the
domestic market and maize imports. Eventually, in 1997, the Maize Board was closed.
Nowadays, the South African agricultural sector and its activities bring 17.4 billion US
dollars to the economy or account for 3.8 percent of the GDP. At the same time the sector
employs as much as 6 percent of the civilian workforce. Much of the value produced comes
from maize, contributing to the fact that South Africa is one of the world’s major producers.
White and yellow maize make up 35 percent of the area planted in the country with almost 65
percent of the maize grown being white and the remaining 35 percent yellow. In order to
provide effective risk management for Maize producers, the Agricultural Markets Division
(AMD) of the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) introduced the white and yellow
maize futures contract in 1996 17. Figure 4.1 presents the trading volume of the white maize
futures contract. Starting from very low levels initially, this has grown at a steady rate of as
                                                 
16
 Interview with Chris Sturgess from SAFEX. It is estimated though that these are primarily large scale producers since small scale farmers
are primarily involved in subsistence farming and are predominantly net purchasers of maize (Bayley, 2000)
17 SAFEX AMD was set-up in 1995. In 2001, SAFEX was bought by the JSE Securities Exchange and since then trading of
agricultural derivatives takes place in the Agricultural Derivatives Division of JSE.
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much as 150 percent annually. In addition, over the same period of time, the ratio of futures
volume to physical production has risen from 0.04 to about 12 times the level of production,
indicating larger uptake of derivatives among producers and agri-businesses as well as active
participation by speculators. A liquid market like SAFEX attracts participants such as
processors, producers and co-operatives. Co-operatives and financiers also assist producers
with the provision of credit for margin requirements and other costs, related to the trading of
derivatives.
At the same time SAFEX AMD also established an options market.  Volumes in the maize
options market also grew rapidly. The advantages of the options market for farmers and
millers, compared to the futures market, was that there were no margin calls for the buyers of
options, and secondly that buyers of options were effectively buying a price floor (farmers) or
a price ceiling (millers) limiting their downside risk without limiting the upside potential in
the market.
Figure 4.1 : Futures volume and Production Cover for the White Maize contract in
SAFEX
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4.2.2 Marketing through Building Relationships
New products can be versatile and effective, but that does not in itself guarantee success.
There need to be expressed commitment and effective strategy, to ensure that an
understanding exists of the benefits and costs of these products. In many cases, this will
include accommodating the farmers’ needs, particularly those with small- and medium-sized
operations. The experience in South Africa has shown that the larger farms are quite familiar
with, and frequently trade, futures, options, and other types of derivative products.
Members of the Exchange provided valuable services in marketing the concept of derivatives
trading to the market. In the early days, they spent many days on the road training and
marketing, first the concept of futures and then later on options, to the entire agricultural
community. This was not easy as they had to persuade farmers and processors, who had been
used to regulation and single-channel sourcing of their products, about the benefits of the free
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market. A number of seminars were also arranged by SAFEX together with broker firms to
assist broking members to source clients or to build relationships with farmers.
4.2.3 The Role of Co-operatives in South Africa
In 1995, there were 238 primary co-operatives and 37 central co-operatives throughout South
Africa. Co-operatives play an important role and provide a number of value-added services to
their members. More specifically, some co-operatives are members of the Exchange and
employ risk managers on a full-time basis, to make trading decisions on behalf of their
members. This is beneficial to farmers since trading decisions are based on extensive research
and informed judgement. In addition, co-operatives pool together various production levels to
match minimum requirement size for futures contracts and margin requirements, which
allows small and medium size producers to indirectly hedge with futures contracts, without
being obliged to provide minimum production levels and/or capital for initial and variation
margins. Also many of the co-operatives enter into forward contracts with producers and then
subsequently hedge these forward contracts into the Exchange, thus enhancing market
liquidity. More recently, there has been a change in the structure of the co-operatives since a
number of them have become companies. Overall, they have given small farmers leverage
which they would not have otherwise, and have also improved their cost structure.
4.2.4 Hedging Performance of the White Maize Contract
Market participants consider that SAFEX provides transparent and competitive information
which accurately reflects commodity prices in the region. Producers are familiar with what
the price on the Exchange represents and often use the futures price in their contract pricing.
The approach toward risk management by the part of producers and processors, has moved a
long way since the initial stages of deregulation. At that time, some market participants
believed that they could manage their price risk through the corresponding derivative
contracts in the US. However, this implied that market participants were exposed to three
different types of price risk instead of just one. First, price risk arising from fluctuations in the
supply and demand for maize in South Africa; second, exchange rate risk arising from
fluctuations in the Rand / US Dollar exchange rate; and finally, basis risk, since the futures
contract is different from the underlying commodity to be hedged and the relationship
between US and South African prices changes markedly depending on whether South African
production is in surplus or deficit in any given year. The latter point is particularly important
for white maize producers and processors since there is no futures market for white maize
anywhere else in the world. As expected, this approach failed to provide satisfactory risk
reduction benefits to market participants, and resulted in both sides of the market having to
use the SAFEX contract for risk management purposes. As is also suggested by Bayley
(2000) this was perhaps the crucial factor behind SAFEX’s growing liquidity, since both
farmers and processors needed urgently to manage their price risk.
As noted earlier, an effective hedge requires low basis risk and a high correlation between
cash and futures price changes which is the case for the white maize contract, as is evidenced
in Figure 4.2. Overall, hedgers in the market can reduce price risk in their physical positions
by as much as 97% which is very effective by any standard, and also outperforms the risk
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reduction evidenced in other exchanges in the EU and the US. This further emphasises the
importance of the SAFEX contract in providing effective risk protection for producers in a
deregulated market.
Figure 4.2 : South Africa white maize cash price versus SAFEX futures price
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4.2.5 Regulatory Environment and Price Transparency
As the market has grown, SAFEX has shifted its focus from educating market participants
about the benefits of futures trading (which is now primarily undertaken by brokers) to
ensuring that investors are aware what their rights are within the rules of the Exchange.
SAFEX also has the usual processes in place for distributing information and, to date, they
supply as much information as possible free of charge, by daily updates on the web page,
distribution by email, or even by SMS. They continually strive to supply price information to
the market as efficiently as possible.
As noted earlier one of the reasons behind the success of SAFEX’s contract is the fact that
producers and processors urgently needed a market to manage their risk and the only viable
method for achieving this was the contract offered by SAFEX. Bayley (2000) also identified a
number of other factors that may have contributed to the establishment and subsequent
growth in the agricultural derivatives market. First, prior to the introduction of the maize
contracts, there existed a critical mass of expertise in trading and using derivative instruments
among market participants. In the mid 1990s, SAFEX was already trading financial derivative
contracts and had an established position as a provider of risk management services in the
financial markets. In addition, financial institutions were already familiar with the concept of
financial derivatives and their use for risk management purposes. Second, there was physical
infrastructure available to facilitate the delivery of the futures contracts. Third, the
deregulation of the domestic agricultural market resulted in market uncertainty and price
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volatility 18; this was perhaps the major contributing factor since price stability does not
provide an environment conducive to derivatives trading and risk management. Finally, the
liberalisation of agricultural trade also had the impact of facilitating the involvement of
international trading houses in the South African market. International trading houses were
already familiar with the use of derivative contracts in other markets, most notably in the US,
and hence were able to migrate their expertise and know how in the newly established
SAFEX AMD.
Overall, The effects of the growth of SAFEX AMD have given rise to some significant
benefits to the government and the wider economy, the most important being the efficiency
benefits of a liberalised market and the transfer of agricultural risk (that was both difficult and
costly to manage) from the Government to the private sector. Agricultural risk can be “off-
loaded” to the financial sector through the use of derivative contracts. This results in greater
stability in agricultural income, price stability in agricultural products and more efficient
allocation of resources in the agricultural economy. Availability of derivative prices also
results in a transparent and competitive price formation process. In line with other established
futures markets, the level of nearby futures provides an indication for the level of prices in the
spot market and is also used as a reference price which market participants take into account
when pricing their contracts.
4.3 The Australian Agricultural Risk Management Experience
Australia is a country with a relatively large agriculture industry, producing many products
ranging from grain, seeds and fruits, to cotton, wool and livestock. Australian grain producers,
in particular, face unique difficulties in the highly competitive global wheat market. For
example, compared to growers in other countries, Australian wheat growers are highly
exposed to fluctuations in exchange rates and world wheat prices. This is because around 79%
of the Australian wheat crop is exported, while only 45% of US wheat and 13% of wheat
produced in the EU goes to international markets. In addition, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, the
outside support provided to Australian growers is less than one-tenth of that provided to their
competitors in the US and the EU, and under half that provided to Canadian growers. Income
support, price support and other implicit subsidies provide Canadian growers with the
equivalent of an extra AU$25 per tonne, US growers with over AU$140 per tonne and EU
growers with over AU$170 per tonne. Wheat growers in these heavily subsidised markets
have expanded their production and export volumes, thus depressing average world wheat
prices, and causing severe world price distortions as well as volatility.
The Australian agricultural sector has always been very dynamic and progressive in risk
management activities. This is partly due to the nature of their agricultural and farming
businesses, which are exposed to extreme weather uncertainties as well as price risk, and
partly due to the limited support provided by the government for farmers and producers. This
environment has helped Australian farmers realise the benefits of derivatives and risk
management and, nowadays, Australian farmers are considered as the largest and most
sophisticated agricultural hedgers in the world.
                                                 
18 Most production and consumption of maize takes place a long way from the coast which, combined with high transport
costs, and tendency for climatic factors to affect yields so that the region oscillates between surplus and deficit production,
results in prices moving between import and export parity prices that are a long way apart.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of Income Support Offered to Major Grain Growers as
Percentage of the Support to Australian Growers
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Australian farmers and other participants in the agricultural business have learned how to deal
with the different risks they face, by extensively using market-based risk management
instruments from insurance policies to derivatives. Despite the absence of organised
derivatives markets for key commodities such as wheat, canola, cotton and sugar, there is
widespread use of OTC options and price swaps indexed to international markets, usually
CBOT or Winnipeg, at the farmer, co-operative and end-user levels of the business chain. In
this respect, financial institutions, such as investment banks, play a major role not only in
training and consulting, but also in providing farmers, producers and other participants with
innovative and flexible financial and risk management products. In Australia, financial
institutions such as Rabobank and National Australian Bank (NAB) have been focusing on
providing products that can meet the unique needs of farmers and growers as well as 'middle
market' clients, such as businesses operating beyond the farm gate in the food and
agribusiness. These financial institutions have special divisions with particular expertise in
providing finance and risk management solutions for farming and agri-businesses in all key
Australian markets, from grain to livestock products. As a result these institution can
successfully utilise their network of expertise and services, to provide innovative financial
solutions customised for each customer - whether a farmer/producer or other middle market
clients such as processing and distribution businesses.
In addition to financial institutions, other agricultural organisations in Australia also provide
services to farmers and growers, such as advisory services with regard to logistics, sales and
marketing issues, as well as risk management activities. One such organisation is the
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) whose purpose is to maximise net pool returns for growers
delivering wheat into the national export wheat pool. The AWB offers delicate risk
management products to its clients using agricultural derivatives traded in international and
US exchanges by “repackaging” them, to take into account currency risk and quality
differential risk. One such product is the Fixed Basis Wheat Contract, which provides the
farmer with control of wheat price risk. A basis contract allows producers to lock in or
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capture an attractive basis for a specific delivery period without being locked into the futures
price at that time. The basis contract is in fact a package combining CBOT wheat futures,
Currency Risk Cover, Fixed Basis Cover and Varital Grade Cover. Using a Fixed Basis
contract the farmer can hedge the price of his wheat production with great efficiency without
having to participate in several contracts to manage each type of risk involved.
An Example of a Fixed Basis Contract
It is January 2004 and a wheat farmer with a May 2004 harvest decides to use a basis contract
to lock into a fixed basis for that harvest. Since there is no exchange traded wheat futures
contract in Australia the closest futures contract available to the farmer, in terms of limited
basis risk and quality differential, is the CBOT wheat futures which is traded in terms of
USc/bu. This also implies that the farmer has to hedge the exchange rate risk exposure using
an US$/AU$ forward contract. The Fixed Basis contract provided by AWB is a simple
combination of the wheat and currency futures contracts but offered as a simple package
which can be quite convenient for the farmer.
Assume the following information is available in January 2004:
 CBOT May 2004 wheat futures is trading at 325 USc/bu;
 CBOT May 2004 wheat futures basis is 15 USc/bu ;
 AU$/US$ forward exchange rate for May 2004 is 0.5800;
 Farmer expects harvest of 1000 tonnes of wheat in May 2004;
 Bushel to tonne conversion =36.7437.
The fixed basis contract is constructed by selling CBOT futures and entering into a forward
AU$/US$ contract proportionate to the size of the futures contract. The farmer can then fix
his wheat basis at 9.5 AU$/tonne to US wheat prices, as follows:
tonneUS
buUSc
tonneUS /$ 512.57437.36*
100
/15
/$in  Basis ==
AU$/tonne
tonneUS
tonneAU  5.9
58.0
/$ 512.5
/$in  Basis ==
Having locked the price with a fixed basis of 9.5 AU$/tonne, assuming zero commission, the
farmer can be sure that he will be getting the futures price less the fixed basis in May 2004.
For instance, if the expected futures price in May 2004 is 325 USc/bu, the farmer will be
getting 196.40 AU$/tonne for his wheat:
tonne 40.1967437.36*
0.58*100
)/15/ 325(
$in   Price AU$/
buUScbuUSc
AU =
−
=
An Example of Collar Option Hedging
An alternative method for managing price risk for the wheat farmer is to use a collar option
contract for hedging. This strategy is formed by combining a call and a put option contracts
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both of which have the same maturity, i.e. May 2004. More specifically, it involves selling a
call option and then, buying a put option with the proceeds. In this way the cost of hedging
can be significantly lower and the farmer can lock his final selling price within a reasonable
band.  In other words, a collar provides both a floor and a cap for the selling price of wheat in
May 2004.
Assume the following information is available in January 2004
 Farmer expects harvest of 1000 tonnes of wheat in May 2004;
  Put price (premium) for 1000 tonnes wheat with strike price of 190 AU$/tonne
expiring in May 2004 is 10 AU$/tonne;
  Call price  (premium) for 1000 tonnes wheat with strike price of 200 AU$/tonne
expiring in May 2004 is 10 AU$/tonne;
By selling the call option and simultaneously buying the put, the farmer can be sure that
whatever the price of wheat in May 2004, he will be receiving no less than 190 AU$/tonne
and no more than 200 AU$/tonne for his wheat, as shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Result of hedging with a zero cost collar option
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It can be observed that, by using a zero cost collar with no initial cost (apart from
commissions), the farmer can control the price risk within a reasonable margin
(approximately 5% of the price), which is normally above his breakeven price. An additional
benefit of using this type of risk control instrument is the enhanced credibility and ability of
the farmer to fulfil any borrowing and loan obligations from the point of view of the financier.
Banks and other creditors are generally interested to see a sound and secure stream of income
before providing cheaper financial arrangements. This has been one of the main drives for
using risk management instruments in Australia, because major financiers offer competitive
financing packages once they see that their client has taken the necessary steps to protect
against market risk.
PAGE 52
5 CHAPTER FIVE
Challenges and Prospects for Agricultural Risk
Management in the EU
5.1 Introduction
The reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy pose new opportunities as well as challenges
for providers of risk management products. The preceding analyses and case studies
highlighted a number of possibilities that can improve producers’ and agri-businesses’ uptake
of derivative products. Looking at the structure of the EU agricultural sector, the institutional
framework provided by CAP, the limited degree of participation by European producers in the
derivatives markets, the availability of risk management products and the deregulation models
in other countries, there are clear opportunities to facilitate new ways of delivering price,
yield and income stability for producers and agri-businesses through wider use of derivatives.
However, this will require, among other things, an extensive programme of education and
training of participants. More specifically, the measures which are identified in this report are:
 Strengthening Education and Training
 Building Relationships through Co-operatives and Farmed Controlled Businesses
 Promote the use of flexible and Over-the-Counter Derivative Instruments
 Promote and strengthen the liquidity of agricultural futures markets
These measures are discussed next:
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5.2 Strengthening Education and Training
Before choosing a risk management strategy, it is essential for producers to understand, at a
basic level, the nature of the risks posed by their business, which of those risks they are
prepared to run and which of them they wish to manage and how they should be managed.
The role of education is particularly important in the agricultural sector because farmers, like
other economic actors, perceive the risks they face as being smaller than they actually are.
This phenomenon is called “cognitive failure” and is often the result of insufficient
information or misjudgement19.
Training should not only focus on risk management tools, but also on how it is being
delivered. As previously mentioned, European farmers are becoming older and spend less
time on farming activities which may indicate that they have less motivation to learn new
methodologies for managing risk or are more concerned with other issues like retirement and
securing their income sources.  The challenge is to align these groups of farmers to pay more
attention to the risk posed by their businesses, so that they are motivated to learn and
eventually use derivatives and/or insurance in ways which, in turn, can help them remain
focused on their core activities. This will not only benefit the agricultural community but also
society as a whole.
Finally, training should not only be targeted at producers but also at those consultants and
other organisations to whom farmers turn for assistance in managing their risk. For instance,
in the UK, Farmcare is currently leading a major training and registration programme, called
the “The Risk Management Network”, for all farming consultants. The programme is
sponsored by a number of organisations, both producers’ associations and commodity trading
houses, and its purpose is to train farming consultants and raise their awareness of the wide
variety of mechanisms and strategies for managing farming risk in all its different forms,
including the use of derivatives and insurance. Consultants who have completed the training
course can then gain a professional accreditation and become members of a professional
register of risk management consultants, established for that purpose.
Examples of Effective Training Schemes
In the US, the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, provides
users on its webpage with access to a myriad of University educational resources which cover
the topic of risk management extensively. They seem to have a more pro-active approach in
terms of derivatives training and appear to understand that the complex features of derivatives
demand a wide range of services, supported by adequate financial investment, people with
know-how, and a clear strategy on how to reach the critical mass.
In Europe, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has
implemented a wide range of information and educational services which have served a broad
customer base including small- and medium-size producers. Similarly, the Home-Grown
Cereals Association (HGCA) has been running, since 2003, a series of regional workshops in
the UK on risk management and the use of financial instrument for producers. The objective
of these workshops is to improve growers’ understanding of the basic mechanics of the grain
market and the need to adopt a more strategic approach to grain marketing. These courses,
                                                 
19 Dirk Ahner (2004): “How can the EU help farmers on Risk management” in Agriculture Perspectives for the EU 25,
Speech on European Commission DG Agriculture.
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provide a hands on intensive approach on the use of risk management tools for the
agricultural industry and are organised in different locations across the UK. HGCA is also
active in organising industry risk management conferences jointly with Euronext.liffe, CBOT
and National Australia Bank for participants from all the sectors of the grain and feed industry
– growers, traders, processors (milling, malting) and feed buyers. The objective of these
conferences is to bring all participants in the grain chain together, so as to understand the
mechanisms and also the benefits of greater use of risk management tools.
These events have been very well received by market participants and have also influenced
the attitudes and perceptions of participants towards the use of risk management tools.
Delegate responses have shown that attending the workshops has greatly improved their
understanding and willingness to use risk management techniques including options and
forward selling, based on the futures markets. Overall, around 93% of delegates considered
these courses to be highly relevant for their activities and stated that attending would result in
changing their business practices. This further illustrates how effective and properly
implemented training schemes can affect farmer’s goals and attitudes towards risk
management. Therefore, more comprehensive training programmes, co-ordinated by the
appropriate authorities at the European level, would greatly increase the uptake of risk
management techniques across the industry.
5.3 Building Relationships through Co-operatives
Co-operatives, are a substantial part of the European agricultural industry since, according to
the Confédération Générale des Coopératives Agricoles de l’Union Européenne (COGECA),
they handle about 210 bn euros turnover, over 50% of shares in the supply of agricultural
inputs, and over 60% of shares in the collection, processing and marketing of agricultural
products. Despite their significance however, co-operatives play a limited role in risk
management especially for small scale producers, but this is gradually changing as new
models of co-operatives management structure are emerging.
A co-operative is an enterprise which exists primarily to serve the interests of its stakeholder
groups - normally farmers, who also own and control it - rather than to provide return on
investment (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). Modern agricultural co-
operatives, for marketing and for purchasing supplies, have become an integral part of the
European Union agriculture industry. Local supply co-operatives have a proud tradition of
providing farmers with a wide range of offerings from seeds to crop-inspection services.
Local marketing co-operatives help farmers to attain the best price for their crops as well as to
provide services such as commodity storage. Local co-operatives and regional co-operatives
have, further, pooled these supplies and marketing activities and have made larger
investments up- or downstream from farms. Currently, new models in co-op organisations are
evolving where co-operatives are increasingly owned by shareholders and are gradually
becoming more like businesses where a minor proportion of shareholders are outside
investors (usually customers rather than farmers) and are run by highly qualified management
(see Table 5.1, Annex 5 for an overview of the different structures of co-operatives).
Co-operatives can create a number of opportunities which would otherwise be unachievable
by an individual producer. Providers of risk management tools should leverage these
centralised organisations - currently there are ten times more farm holdings than co-operatives
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in the EU - to efficiently distribute information to the critical mass. Co-operatives have
traditionally offered members valuable services in exchange for commitment and trust. If co-
operatives are convinced that, in the future, derivatives and insurance can play an essential
role in risk management, their members will need to be able to access affordable risk
management instruments and providers of risk management products can look forward to
acquiring new customers and developing new products.
Co-operatives can also assist in reducing the gap between small and part-time farmers on the
one hand and derivatives markets on the other. First, they can offer assistance through
professional managers who have access to market information and understand the concept of
trading derivatives and, hence, can develop and implement effective risk management
strategies. This step is important since producers, irrespective of age, are not always familiar
with the structure and functioning of derivative markets. Second, co-operatives may pool
together production from small-scale farmers in order to realize minimum size requirements
for derivative contracts; they can also get better pricing and much lower transaction costs than
hedging on an individual basis. The latter is important since many farmers, on their own, may
not be able to afford the level of transaction costs or the margin requirements. It is also
interesting to note that a survey of the risk attitudes of producers in the UK, conducted by
NFU, identified lack of understanding and transaction costs as the main barriers for the
adoption of futures contracts, options contracts and cost insurance by the farming community.
Finally, another important benefit of letting co-operatives service the hedging needs of their
members is that it will enable farmers to spend more time on farming than managing their use
of risk management products.
Today, co-operatives have become more independent as their activities can rely on external
shareholders, while the use of professional managers to run them provides safeguards against
any agency problems which may arise. With a strong plan and use of alternative governance,
co-operatives can be more involved in risk management to satisfy demanding producers who
face volatile commodity prices. Funding from external sources will enable these organisations
to better assist agri-businesses by identifying their members’ price risk management areas and
creating customised risk management products and also by providing finance for margin
deposits, margin calls, and other costs associated with trading in derivatives markets. It seems
therefore that in a deregulated European agricultural sector, co-operatives can play a pivotal
role in the provision of risk management services and, hence, should be the prime target of
providers of such products such as trading houses, commodity brokers and investment banks.
5.3.1 Targeting Small Scale Producers via Local Co-operatives: the Case
of the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management
The International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management also presents an interesting
example of how agricultural risk management projects can be tailored to meet the needs of
small-scale producers. In 1999, the World Bank convened an International Task Force (ITF)
on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries to explore new, market-based
approaches to assist developing countries better manage their vulnerability to commodity
risks, including price risk and weather risk. Managing risks in highly volatile commodity
markets remains one of the major challenges for developing countries, since, according to the
World Bank, more than 50 developing countries depend on three or fewer leading
commodities for more than one half of their export earnings. In many of these countries,
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commodity production and trade affect the livelihood of millions of people, the government’s
fiscal revenue and public expenditure, as well as the government’s ability to maintain a
conducive and stable environment for domestic business and to implement policies and
programmes to reduce poverty.
The Commodity Risk Management (CRM) Group is the implementing agency for the work of
the ITF at the World Bank. The CRM team is comprised of commodities experts, financial
analysts, training personnel, and derivatives specialists working to make market-based price
risk and weather risk management instruments available to developing country producers, and
works in conjunction with supporting governments, international organisations and the private
sector. The CRM team also carries out research and provides training on using innovative
tools for risk management.
For instance, one such pilot transaction implemented by CRM in conjunction with Rabobank,
was the purchase of price insurance (i.e. put options) for coffee co-operatives in Uganda and
Tanzania. This resulted in price stability for local producers who were then free to market
their physical product knowing they have a floor price in place. It is estimated that this
particular transaction benefited several thousands of small coffee farmers in these countries.
Other innovative tools proposed by CRM include the implementation of rainfall-index
insurance in Morocco and rainfall insurance policies in India. These examples also highlight
the broader role that co-operatives can play in the provision of risk management services, by
acting as intermediaries between local farmers and providers of risk management services.
The issue that arises is whether a similar approach towards risk management could also be
applied to small-sized farmers in developed countries and in particular in the EU. One expects
that what works for developing countries must work much more efficiently in developed
countries for a number of reasons: first, in developed countries the physical infrastructure is
already in place; second, there are established capital and financial markets which provide
price transparency and a mechanism for transferring risk; and, third, there will be significant
reductions in the levels of credit risk and sovereign risk for financial service suppliers,
compared to those operating in developing countries.
5.4 Introduction of Flexible Derivative Instruments
The success of relying on new risk management schemes and products depends greatly on
their ability to meet the needs of users, to provide simplicity in terms of trading and regulation
and to be liquid and affordable.  The diversity of the agricultural industry and business in the
EU in terms of the number of products, quality differentials, regional disparities and
production cycles, suggests that the existing range of standardised exchange-traded derivative
products may not be suitable for everyone.  In this respect, it is anticipated that exchanges will
need to develop new products. At the same time, more flexible over-the-counter (OTC)
products can be used on their own or along with exchange-traded products to help ensure that
there is an appropriate match between the underlying risk and the risk management product.
OTC instruments are traded outside organised Exchanges through a network of dealers and
brokers. The major advantage of OTC instruments over exchange-traded derivatives is that
they provide a great degree of flexibility to their users, as they can be tailored to cover specific
risk exposures, very efficiently. For instance, OTC derivatives can be structured in such a way
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so as to manage risks which cannot be managed by Exchange traded derivatives or to cover
long-dated exposures which exceed the maturities of exchange traded instruments. In
addition, OTC derivatives may not involve physical delivery of the underlying commodity,
and, consequently, the hedger does not have to commit the physical crop. Furthermore, it has
been observed in other industries that when exchange-traded instruments are not effective in
providing risk reduction, OTC derivatives are introduced and gradually dominate the market
with the active participation of financial institutions20. On the other hand, the major
disadvantage of OTC instruments is the existence of credit or default risk. This is the risk
when a counterparty does not honour its obligation with respect to meeting the derivatives
contract in full and on time. This is not an issue in contracts traded in organised exchanges
since the performance of exchange traded contracts is guaranteed by a clearing house. This
also implies that the OTC market may be better suited to individuals or corporations with
solid credit standing and/or large capital base.  However, there are now instruments available
which can be used to control credit risk.
The successful implementation of OTC products requires careful planning and substantial
investment both in training and education, as well as infrastructure. More specifically, the
necessary requirements are:
1- Availability of Transparent Market Indicators. This step is very important as pricing,
trading and settlement of derivative instruments are normally based on such indicators.
For example, in order to use derivatives for yield risk management, there must exist an
independent yield reporting system to produce frequent and reliable assessments on yield
and production across different regions. Once the yield assessment is available, market
participants - such as farmers, elevators, insurance companies and financial institutions -
would be able to trade, hedge or speculate on the expected yield in each region. The
existence of a reliable regional yield assessment will also eliminate issues, such as moral
hazard and adverse selection. In the US, such assessments are produced by USDA for
different regions on regular basis.21 In the EU, the Agriculture Department of the
European Commission could be active in producing independent yield assessments for
different regions. Such a scheme could also improve market transparency in relation to
price and production yield, which is absolutely necessary for the efficient operation of the
market for agricultural products in the EU.
2- Active Participation by Financial Institutions. For derivative markets to be successful
in their risk management and price discovery roles, they should be liquid enough to a)
reduce transaction cost; and b) enhance pricing and risk management efficiency.
Therefore, the introduction of new derivative products should be done with careful
consideration to offer the best and most flexible product. To that extent, providers of
agricultural risk management services should put more emphasis on the research,
development, pricing, marketing and trading of these products.
                                                 
20 Two main examples here are the shipping freight and fuel oil markets where exchange traded derivative instruments were
not successful and gradually OTC derivatives took over due to their flexibility and better performance in terms of risk
management.
21 In other industries there are similar reporting mechanisms in place. For instance, in shipping, assessments are made on the
level of freight rates in different shipping routes by the Baltic Exchange in London. Forward Freight contracts are then traded
in the market based on these assessments. In the oil industry, Platt’s is publishing assessments on prices of oil and products
across different parts of the world. Major oil traders, consumers and other parties use these assessments to price and trade
numerous derivative instruments.
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3- Availability of Know-How through Training. The significance of training as a factor
conducive to the successful launch and operation of derivatives markets has already been
discussed. Any new derivative product must be promoted first to its end users (producers),
who must be familiar with the way derivative markets operate.
4- Support by Local Governments to Promote the Use of these Instruments. The role of
the EC and governments not only in channelling funds to educating and training
producers, but also to support them in using such market mechanism for risk management,
is quite important.
5.4.1 Major Types of Agricultural OTC Instruments
OTC instruments vary in their specification and characteristics. They include simple put and
call options with different specifications than those offered in organised exchanges. For
instance, the contract size may be smaller than the contract size at organised exchanges so as
to facilitate smaller users. Other products can be more sophisticated and include combinations
of other more simple instruments or simply new instruments that are used to cover specific
risks such as weather. Some of those products include:
CFDs
Contracts for Difference (CFDs) are contracts to exchange the difference between two prices
for a notional volume at certain time in the future. CFDs are offered by financial institutions
for a number of products and are successfully used for agricultural price risk management by
Australian farmers and producers. An example of a typical CFD is the exchange of Australian
wheat prices with CBOT futures prices for a notional amount, say 5,000 bushels, at a certain
date in the future. By using such contracts farmers can eliminate any basis risk which exists
between their products and those for which exchange-traded futures contracts are available.
Another example is a CFD on the quality differential between two different types of wheat
which can be used by producers to manage the quality risk of their product.
Zero Cost Collars
It is sometimes argued that options can be expensive risk management tools especially in the
case of agricultural price risk management. This is because if a producer wants to buy price
insurance (i.e. put options), he must pay the option premium upfront and in addition, the
higher the trigger level (strike price) of the option, the more expensive the option will be. A
way round this is for the producer to “sacrifice” some of the upside gains for protection
against downside risk. This can be achieved through the use of zero-cost collars (cylinder
options). A zero cost collar is in fact a combination of a put and a call, and can be constructed
by selling a call option at strike price X1 and for maturity at time T, and then by using the
proceeds from the sale of the call to buy a put at strike price X2 and the same maturity.
Normally X1 is greater than X2, and, as a result, the farmer can be guaranteed that the selling
price of his product will not be lower than X2 and higher than X1.  The main advantage of
collars is that the cost of managing price (or yield) risk is substantially lower than when a put
or a forward contract is used (see as well section 4.3 for an example on zero cost collars).
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Weather Derivatives and Risk Management
One most important risk factor that farmers are exposed to is weather and its impact on
farmers’ production and income. Bad weather conditions such as hail, frost, flood, drought
and storm may partially or totally destroy the crop and leave farmers with no protection in a
very difficult situation. These adverse weather conditions are considered as correlated risk
which can affect farming in an entire region and, as a result, farmers might find it expensive
to insure against them.
Although governments, especially in the US and the EU, have established provisions such as
“catastrophic aid” and other safety net helps, in recent years there has been a growth in
weather derivatives which can be used by farmers and insurers, in order to control their
income and revenue risk due to adverse weather. Weather derivatives can be used to hedge
yield-related risks caused by extreme variations in environmental conditions over defined
future time periods. These are mainly OTC contracts contingent on specific weather
conditions such as amount of precipitation, hot degree-days or cold degree-days. For instance,
a farmer can use the rainfall index in his region to hedge against excess rainfall which is
harmful to the crop. In this case, the farmer can buy a call option on the rainfall index which
pays off if the rainfall exceeds a certain level, which is the strike price of the option. The
payoff from the option should then be enough to compensate the farmer for the loss due to
excess precipitation. Similarly, the protection cover for a drought or lack of precipitation can
be designed using a put option on the rainfall index which pays off when the precipitation is
less than an agreed level, i.e. the strike price of the put.
Currently weather derivatives for agribusiness are traded in Australia, the US and the UK to a
limited extent, and are more applicable to large corporate grain and cotton growers and
suppliers of agrochemicals. Because the impact of weather conditions affects an entire region,
as opposed to an individual farm, farmers could participate in the weather derivatives markets
through regional co-operatives which can create the necessary economies of scale to make
these products accessible to smaller farmers. In addition, implementation of successful
weather derivatives instruments requires a reliable and fairly assessed index of weather
conditions (such as rain, cold degree-days, hot degree-days, etc.), on which derivative
contracts can be priced, traded and settled. It is also worth noting that currently, projects
involving the use of weather derivatives are implemented in developing countries through the
CRM group of World Bank (see also section 5.3.1)
Forward Yield Agreements
Forward Yield Agreements (FYA) are contracts which allow farmers, elevators, insurance
companies and others to hedge agricultural production risk. The idea behind FYAs is to trade
forward contracts on an average yield index for different regions. For instance a farmer who is
concerned about the effect of natural disasters on his crop will sell an appropriate FYA
contract to a counterparty (e.g. a bank), to hedge his future crop yield.
Swing Contracts
Swing contracts are forward or option contracts on the price of an underlying asset, where one
party has the option to change the notional volume of the underlying asset within a pre-
specified range. Consider the case of a farmer who is uncertain about his production yield. He
PAGE 60
can enter into a swing contract where the forward price is fixed while the notional volume can
be anything from, say 1,000 to 5,000 bushels, with the exact amount being determined at the
maturity of the contract. By using this contract, the farmer eliminates any uncertainty
regarding the amount of crop to hedge.
Other Exotic Options and Risk Management Products
In addition to the aforementioned instruments, there are numerous other types of derivative
instruments which financial services providers can develop and offer to farmers for the
purposes of agricultural price and yield risk management. Such instruments are used
extensively in the financial OTC derivative markets, and their migration to the agricultural
derivatives markets could be done relatively easily. Such instruments include, for instance,
forward start options, knock-in and knock-out options etc.
5.5 Enhancing Liquidity in Agricultural Derivatives Exchanges
Liquidity is another essential parameter when introducing new contracts in derivatives
markets. For a futures market to attract market participants, whether hedgers or speculators,
they have to be assured to some degree that futures trades will compel them only to deliver
the underlying commodity on the basis of their own initiative. European Exchanges are
constantly taking measures to offer high liquidity and sufficient market depth, which enables
speedy execution of small as well large orders with minimum price changes and maintaining a
fair price movement. In addition, as noted elsewhere in this report, liquidity is also linked to
the prevailing agricultural policy framework, and in particular the extent and nature of
administrative controls over exports.
PAGE 61
6 CHAPTER SIX
Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
The European agricultural sector has gone through three major reforms of the Common
Agricultural Policy in the last decade. These include the MacSharry reform (1992), the
AGENDA 2000 reform (1999) and, more recently, the 2003-04 reform. These reforms were
meant to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector in an increasingly competitive
global market by restructuring the financial transfers to the sector. The restructuring was also
critical because the financial transfers system would not have been financially viable after the
inclusion of the ten new accession countries to the EU. The major issues that are examined in
this report include:
The extent to which reforms in CAP have an impact on the volatility of EU
wheat prices and the likely outcome once further reforms are implemented
Statistical analysis of EU wheat prices, presented in this report, indicates that, overall, the
volatility of farm gate prices in EU member states has become significantly higher, as a result
of both the 1992 and AGENDA 2000 reforms. The ongoing 2003-04 reforms will result in
further cuts in market price support measures which, combined with the commitment under
WTO to improve market access, should increase the volatility of agricultural prices even
further. Consequently, the use of market-based mechanisms for managing agricultural risk
may be the best available solution for market participants and farmers to reduce income
variability associated with price risk.
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The extent to which farmers and producers in the EU, use risk management instruments
Currently, there is a limited degree of participation of producers in risk management
activities, and derivatives in particular, for which a number of reasons are put forward in this
report: first, the income stability provided by CAP implies that producers have little or no
incentive to conduct hedging; second, lack of understanding of risk management products by
producers, since only a small number of European farmers has the knowledge, training and
resources to understand and make use of agricultural derivatives; third, the availability of
other risk management tools such as product diversification and income from non-farming
activities.
The experience of other countries that have undergone agricultural
liberalisation
Overall, it seems that there are opportunities for farmers and producers in different member
states to make wider and more effective use of derivatives and other risk management
instruments, to stabilise their income. Consequently, derivatives can provide a viable and
effective form of income protection for agricultural farmers. To that extent, valuable lessons
can be learned from the case of South Africa, where there was a gradual transition from
complete government control of the maize market, to a free market, where the Futures
Exchange plays a major role in the provision of risk management services. Five main causes
were behind the success of the maize contract on the Exchange: first, SAFEX AMD benefited
from the reputation of the SAFEX financial futures market, the number of financial
institutions prepared to participate in the nascent market and provide it with liquidity, as well
as the critical mass of experienced derivative market brokers and traders that already existed
as a result of SAFEX; second, the good quality physical infrastructure that allowed SAFEX
AMD to establish a system of physical delivery that ensured that near-dated futures did
closely relate to the spot market; third, the high level of price risk arising from the specific
characteristics of the South African maize market; fourth, the degree of commitment
expressed by market participants to educate and train the agricultural community; and finally,
the Government managed the transition to a liberalised market in a way that was sensitive to
the needs of the nascent SAFEX AMD, in particular by restricting the Maize Board’s powers
to manage exports administratively.
Proposed measures to raise awareness and enhance the of derivatives
One of the major challenges to providers of risk products is the diversity of the European
agricultural sector due to differences in produce, production levels and farm holdings across
the member states. In addition, an ageing farm population and an increase in the number of
part-time farmers can further slow down the uptake of derivatives by the sector in the future.
Taking these parameters into consideration, the measures, proposed in this report, to promote
the uptake of derivatives by market participants, are:
  Promotion of derivatives through education and training, since this will help
producers to understand the benefits of derivatives trading. Training should also be
targeted at those consultants and other organisations to whom farmers turn for assistance
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in managing their risk, as in the “The Risk Management Network” established by
Farmcare in the UK
 Channelling risk management products through farmer-focused organisations: these
could provide a very useful framework, through which the use of derivatives might be
channelled to small producers. To this extent, valuable lessons could also be learned by
the World Bank Project on commodity risk management
  Development and marketing of flexible instruments: the diversity of the agriculture
industry and business in the EU in terms of, number of products, quality differentials,
regional disparities, and production cycles, also calls for the development of more flexible,
OTC derivative products that can provide a good fit to the requirements of market
participants in the physical market
 Proactive involvement of exchanges, banks and financial institutions involved in the
agricultural sector, since these organisations provide risk management services and
finance farming and agricultural ventures. Experience from other agricultural economies
(South Africa, Australia and the US) indicates that financial institutions, exchanges and
banks can play a vital role in providing appropriate infrastructure, training and
instruments, for market-based risk trading.
6.2 Areas for Further Research
The 6.7 million farm holdings in the European Union and the regional differences in the
structure of the agricultural sector, between relatively larger farms in Northern Europe and
small farm holdings with predominantly part-time farmers in the South, present the providers
of risk management services with some unique challenges. In order to ensure that derivative
markets are more transparent, more efficient and ultimately attractive to European producers
and agri-businesses, a number of issues need to be investigated further:
Comprehensive analysis of risk and attitudes towards risk in the European
agricultural sector
A detailed assessment is required of the different risks EU farmers face, their use of
alternative risk management strategies and the changes they would have to make if faced with
financial difficulty, since very little is known about their individual goals and attitudes
towards risk. For instance, USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS), in
the US, has conducted a thorough and extensive examination of the risks that US farmers are
facing which are also ranked according to crops harvested, farm type and regional
characteristics. In the EU, only two similar surveys, by NFU in the UK and in the
Netherlands, have been carried out, which have shown that producers are resolute in using
risk management strategies suitable for the types of risk they face. However, the diversity of
the agricultural sector in the EU and the regional differences between North and South Europe
call for a more thorough investigation of the issue. Issues such as scale of production, types of
crops being produced and time spent on farm activities, present challenges to the providers of
risk management services. Understanding the producers’ needs across the different member
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states can assist in channelling derivative products more efficiently and in producers
perceiving derivative markets as more viable risk management tools.
Investigation and comparison of different risk management tools in terms of
effectiveness, costs and benefits
Further investigation is required on the effectiveness of alternative risk management tools in
reducing risks associated with farming activities. European producers can adopt a range of
strategies like diversification, flexibility, production contracts, marketing contracts and
insurance. Particularly insurance, diversification, and off-farm work are widely used,
sometimes depending on the type of crops being harvested, and government support in the
form of subsidies. Not only are surveys needed to identify the use of such risk management
strategies, but also are studies to consider the value of these strategies with respect to farmers
as well as to society in general. Along the same lines, it would also be informative to evaluate
the cost of central subsidies under the CAP, compared to the cost of privatising risk
management in the context of the impact on the taxpayer, the farming community and retail
consumers.
Further research on the development of new products for agricultural risk
management
Further investigation is also required on how to improve existing products and how to offer
more innovative derivative products which can provide a better fit to the requirements of
market participants. For instance, combining market-based risk management methods with
lower levels of leverage can improve the credit facilities offered to producers by financial
services providers. In addition, providers of risk management products can use structured
contracts in conjunction with Exchange traded instruments to deliver tailor-made risk tools.
This would not only fit better with the needs of producers in terms of risk protection, but also
enhance the liquidity of exchange traded contracts through increasing the trading volume of
the latter instruments. Further studies in this area can assist European risk providers to
understand the potential of this market and eventually to offer new products with high
liquidity and low access cost in the markets to suit both large and small farmers.
Extend the current analysis to different agricultural products in Europe
This study necessarily concentrated only on arable crops, and in particular wheat, as it is the
single most important agricultural produce of the EU and receives the largest share of
subsidies under CAP. However, EU countries produce a multitude of agricultural products
which are also covered by CAP and producers of such goods are going to be affected, both by
the impending CAP reforms as well as by the reforms under the WTO agreement.
Consequently, further study is needed on the issue of how CAP reforms are going to affect all
EU farmers and producers and, most importantly, how risk management tools can alleviate
the problem of higher volatility in agricultural prices. Livestock, for instance, is one sector
which will be affected substantially by the ongoing liberalisation of CAP.
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Annex 1: Structure and characteristics of EU Agriculture
Figure A1.1: Agriculture sector and the European economy: Share of GDP
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Figure A1.2: Agriculture sector and the European economy: Share of civilian Workforce
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Figure A1.3: Relation between farm size and off-farm work
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Figure A1.4: Share of age in EU agricultural sector
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Figure A1.5: Composition of EU cereal output, 2001 
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Annex 2: Analysis of Volatility of Wheat Prices 
 
F-Tests on Volatility  
It is believed that the MacSharry reform has increased the volatility of common soft wheat 
prices in the EU. This hypothesis is tested statistically using an F test which is formulated as 
follows: 
 H0: σ2Jan85–May93 = σ2July93-Dec03  
H1: σ2Jan85–May93 ≠ σ2July93- Dec03 
 
where σ2Jan85–May93 and σ2July93- Dec03 are unconditional variances of farm gate prices over the 
period January 1985 to May 1993, and July 1993 to December 2003, respectively.  The above 
hypothesis can be tested using the ratio of variances as follows: 
      (A2.1)  
 
Results from the tests are presented in Table A2.5 below 
 
Table A2.5 Volatility (Variance) of Grain Prices before and after the 1992 CAP reform 
 σ 2 before σ 2after F-test Prob. Change 
Spain 0.0006 0.0011 2.0739         0.0001*** Increase 
Italy 0.0012 0.0008 1.4792         0.0352** Decrease 
Germany 0.0013 0.0017 1.2930         0.0907* Increase 
France 0.0023 0.0027 1.2050         0.1670 Unchanged 
UK 0.0011 0.0029 2.5649         0.0000*** Increase 
US Soft Red  0.0058 0.0061 1.0499         0.3961 Unchanged 
FCW 0.0049 0.0054 1.1099 0.3219 Unchanged 
Note: Sample includes January 1985 – May 1993, July 1993 – December 2003 (July 1993 – July 2000 for Italy). *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  FCW is French Common Wheat, which is the European 
bench mark export price.  
 
 
Exponential GARCH models  
As a second and more robust approach for testing change in price volatility before and after 
the 1992 CAP reform, we use the Exponential Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model of Nelson (1991). This model is modified to include a 
binary dummy variable, Dt, in the conditional variance equation which takes values of zero 
prior July 1993 and one after.  The mean model for price changes is defined as an 
autoregressive model while the variance equation is specified as an EGARCH model in the 
following form: 
  
(A2.2)  
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The main advantage of the EGARCH model is that it takes into account the evolution of price 
levels, and the mean and volatility equations are both estimated in a simultaneous framework. 
In the above setting, the hypothesis of whether there has been an increase in volatility of EU 
farm gate prices can be tested through the significance of the estimated coefficient for δ. 
Results from this model are presented in Table A2.6. 
 
Table A2.6: Estimation Result of Dynamic Volatility Models 
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 Spain France Germany UK FCW US Soft Red 
Mean       α0 0.0015 0.0055 0.0087*** 0.0054 -0.0007 0.0013 
 (0.0017) (0.0069) (0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0079) (0.0038) 
       α1 0.4079*** 0.1597**  0.2454*** 0.3056***  
 (0.0634) (0.0811)  (0.0697) (0.0764)  
       α2 -0.2078***      
 (0.0538)      
       α6      -0.2239*** 
      (0.0692) 
       α7      -0.1638** 
      (0.0750) 
       α12  0.4730*** 0.5305*** 0.1564***   
  (0.0406) (0.0209) (0.0487)   
       β1   0.3945***    
   (0.0155)    
Variance       γ0 -8.0191*** -7.2027*** -8.3274*** -7.4282*** -5.4867*** -5.3229*** 
 (0.3430) (0.1205) (0.3394) (0.2722) (0.2942) (0.1789) 
       γ1 0.4411* 0.4389*** 0.9780*** 0.6410*** 0.2053 -0.0599 
 (0.2393) (0.1076)  (0.1612) (0.1823) (0.2722) (0.1605) 
       δ 0.7686** 0.4676*** -0.1133 0.9630*** -0.0174 0.2484 
 (0.3282) (0.1365) (0.4027) (0.3195) (0.3017) (0.1853) 
R-bar squared 0.0874 0.193 0.5024 0.000 0.0773 0.0551 
Sample period is from 1985:1 to 2003:12. The dummy variable which measures the impact of 1992 CAP reform on volatility 
take value of zero prior to May 1993 and one after June 1993.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Correlation tests
Table A2.7 Correlation between farm gate and international price levels
Panel A
Sample Period:  1985:1 - 1993:5
France Germany Italy Spain UK FCW US SRW
France 1.000
Germany 0.402 1.000
Italy
 a
0.073 0.669 1.000
Spain 0.452 0.654 0.448 1.000
UK 0.191 -0.008 -0.248 0.415 1.000
FCW -0.392 -0.139 0.233 -0.035 0.117 1.000
US Soft Red -0.160 -0.050 -0.146 0.152 0.185 0.891 1.000
Panel B
Sample Period: 1993:7 – 2003:12
France Germany Italy Spain UK FCW US SRW
France 1.000
Germany 0.873 1.000
Italy
 a
0.773 0.725 1.000
Spain 0.727 0.695 0.661 1.000
UK 0.895 0.811 0.799 0.817 1.000
FCW 0.591 0.431 0.461 0.723 0.761 1.000
US Soft Red 0.595 0.654 0.435 0.678 0.696 0.890 1.000
Note: Italian farm gate prices are not available after July 2000. Source: International Grain Council, New Cronos
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Annex 4: Historical Spot and Futures Prices of Wheat in
Different European Countries
Figure A4. 1: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Feed Wheat Contract against UK Feed Wheat
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Figure A4. 2: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Feed Wheat Contract against Irish Feed Wheat
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Figure A4. 3: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Feed Wheat Contract against German Feed Wheat
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Figure A4. 4: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Feed Wheat Contract against Spanish Feed Wheat
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Figure A4.5: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Feed Wheat Contract against Portuguese Feed Wheat
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Figure A4. 6: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Milling Wheat Contract against German Milling Wheat
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Figure A4.7: Plot of Euronext.liffe nearby Milling Wheat Contract against French Milling Wheat
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Annex 5: Models of Co-Operatives
Table A5.1: Co-operative models in the EU
Traditional
co-ops
Share co-ops
Daughter
co-ops
Tradable shares
co-ops (NGC)
Limited liability
co-ops (PLC)
Membership Free Free Changing Limited Changing
Personal liability No For investors For investors Yes Yes
Voting scheme Equal right Members: yield Members: yield Based on yields,
investments
Based on shares
Decisive control Members Members Members through
co-op
Members Investors
External shares No Yes Yes Limited Yes
Membership shares Equal Equal Equal Based on yield Shares
Returns Based  on
yields
Members: yield
Investors: shares
Members: yield
Investors: shares
Members: yield
Investors: shares
Members: yield
Investors: shares
Professional manager No Not always Yes Yes Yes
Source: Bouckova, B. (2002) Agricultural co-operatives: perspective for the 21st century, AGRIC. ECON. 48, (4): 166–170
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